

*The first of six articles in this issue reviews the relationship between the East European states and the Soviet Union. The author points out that "... at the moment the outlook for the full sovereignty of the East European states is dark indeed. Their relations with the Soviet Union cannot be compared with relations among non-Communist states."*

## The U.S.S.R., East Europe and the Socialist Commonwealth

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THERE IS NO evidence that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin planned for Soviet hegemony over East Europe. A genuine internationalist, he was preoccupied with party politics and the future of international communism. He asserted that "the interests of socialism, of world socialism, are higher than national interests, higher than the interests of the state."<sup>1</sup> He did not foresee that the Moscow-directed Communist International (Comintern), whose delegates represented many nationalities, would lead to Soviet imperialist ambitions for dominance over as many states as possible through the instruments of native Communist parties, with particular emphasis on central East Europe. During the interwar period, world political conditions precluded implementation of such a policy.

Only after World War II, when the East European belt of states from the Baltic to the Black Sea had become a political vacuum, was Premier Josef Stalin able to establish a

*cordon sanitaire* along the Soviet Union's western borders. Through the gradual investiture of puppet governments and the exploitation of allied concessions made in good faith at Yalta, Stalin succeeded in creating a political, economic and strategic barrier between the U.S.S.R. and the West, a policy still pursued by his successors. The division of Germany and the total Soviet control over East Germany, as well as the rape of the Baltic states, seem to make this barrier a vastly improved Soviet version of the Maginot line; flanking movements by Western opponents have been highly unlikely.

The men Stalin put in charge of the East European countries were dedicated Communists, subject to party discipline. Since the Communist party of the Soviet Union (C.P.-S.U.) was not merely *primus inter pares* but rather the "vanguard" and recognized leader of world communism holding a crushingly superior military power, East Europe became, for all practical purposes, a part of the Soviet Union. By 1947, the "Soviet bloc" had emerged. While the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav rupture between parties (not states) created the first crack in the monolith, the bloc re-

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Moscow, 1965, p. 378, as quoted by N. Kapchenko, in "The Leninist Theory and Practice of Socialist Foreign Policy," *International Affairs*, No. 9, Moscow, 1968, p. 57.

mained fairly cohesive until about 1956, when Premier Nikita Khrushchev had consolidated his position and finally dared to denigrate Stalin.

It is perhaps permissible to speculate whether the men in the Kremlin—Stalin included—began to feel uneasy concerning the future of Soviet-East European relations in the early 1950's. The failure to subdue Yugoslavia may have contributed to a review of tactics—though not of strategy. There are some such indications in Deputy Chairman Georgi Malenkov's report to the 19th Congress in 1952, wherein he stressed the "national independence" of the socialist states, a gesture apparently designed to assuage the undercurrents of East European nationalism and the revulsion against what for all practical purposes was foreign rule. If this is a correct "kremloginological" deduction, it was Malenkov—speaking for Stalin—rather than Khrushchev who initiated what four years later became known as "different roads to socialism." During the years between the 19th and 20th Congresses of the C.P.S.U., the seeds of this concept took root and moved the Khrushchev leadership eventually to adopt new tactics with a view to strengthening the doubtful loyalty of the East European nations to the Soviet Union. Thus, as a result of the thesis of the 20th Congress, polycentric, decentralized communism developed.

The 20th Congress decreased Soviet pressure on the restive satellites, with spectacular consequences in Poland and Hungary. But if there were any doubt that the Soviet leaders still regarded the maintenance of their safety belt of states as essential, regardless of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, the brutality of Soviet action in Hungary removed it. Even though Khrushchev may have concluded that the strategic value of East Europe had diminished as a result of the new weapons technology, Moscow's insistence that this area remain its proper sphere of interest continued as a basic principle of Soviet policy.

Any hopes the West might have cherished for a genuine relaxation of Soviet dominance over East Europe were removed by Moscow's

action in Hungary. There is a significant parallel in the West's growing optimism during the 1960's, until the invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated once again that the Soviet Union was still a revolutionary state, that its basic policies and goals were unchanged and that the policy of "peaceful co-existence" was merely a stratagem to increase its power without risking nuclear war.

Nevertheless, the incubus Khrushchev produced with his denigration of Stalin and his thesis of varying roads to socialism could not be exorcised and threatened to endanger the basic Soviet policy of dominance over East Europe. However, despite the nearly catastrophic events of 1956, the Soviet leaders succeeded during 1957 in stabilizing their relations with the East European and other Communist parties. They were therefore able to hold their 1957 summit meeting in which, with the help of the Chinese Communists, the unity of the Communist world was apparently restored and the Soviet party was once again acknowledged as the vanguard of the international movement.

## ORGANIZATION

While the Soviet Union's great power could support world communism more realistically than could the Comintern, the demise of that organization in 1943 and the failure of the Cominform (dissolved in 1956) resulted in a fundamental weakness: the lack of a unifying organization. Since organization is one of the most potent weapons in the Leninist plan of action, the Soviet leaders undoubtedly searched for ways and means to restore some organizational cohesiveness. Indeed, the October 30, 1956, "Declaration of the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the Basic Factors in the Development and Further Consolidation of Friendship and Cooperation Among the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States" was written not only to calm East European unrest but also to inject new meaning into what was called the world socialist system:

United by the common ideal of building a socialist society and by the principles of proletarianism, the countries of the great commonwealth

of socialist nations can build their relations only on the basis of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty and non-interference in each others' internal affairs. . . .

One year later, the "Declaration of the Conference of the Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries" stated:

The socialist states are united into one commonwealth, by having entered upon the common class substance of their social and economic system and state authority, and by the need for mutual support and aid, by community of interests and objectives in the struggle against imperialism and further victory of socialism and communism, and by a Marxist-Leninist ideology common to them all.<sup>2</sup>

The 21st Congress endorsed this position in a resolution of February 5, 1959, which stated that one of the party's principal tasks in the field of international relations was to promote the "consolidation in every way possible of the world socialist system and the commonwealth of fraternal peoples."

Since it was impossible to set up a new Comintern or any similar organization suggesting the renewal of Soviet dictatorial control over the Communist parties in East Europe and elsewhere, the Kremlin may have seen its only chance to restore an international organization of sorts by fostering the creation of a commonwealth of like-minded states which eventually might solidify a new International. The term commonwealth (sometimes paraphrased as community) is an inadequate rendition of the untranslatable Russian composite *sodruzhestvo*, a Stalinist expression which was applied originally to the multinational character of the U.S.S.R. Since 1955, it has been used to connote international organization and since 1956 it has been promoted vigorously. It is a concept of some subtlety, an organization without organization, based primarily on ideological affinities among socialist states without reference to Soviet primacy. Presumably the Soviet leaders thought that this commonwealth might enhance the "world socialist

system" and develop eventually into a Communist "united nations." While conceived primarily as consisting of Communist-ruled states, the commonwealth left open the door for the entry of other sympathetic states. There was no mention of limited sovereignty for states which joined the commonwealth; national independence was stressed and the much advertised unity of purpose was pictured as natural and voluntary.

### PEKING-MOSCOW RIVALRY

This greatly touted substitute for world Communist organization ceased to be publicized after 1960, when the conflict between Moscow and Peking became public knowledge. The conflict forced the Soviet leaders, at least for the time being, to accept a considerable contraction of the commonwealth at the same time that polycentrism was making a steadily increasing impact on Communist parties throughout the world. Moscow was unable to prevent the spreading of this dread disease and the commonwealth idea was hardly mentioned until the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

Originally the attitude of Communist China vis-à-vis the commonwealth was not hostile. It did, however, create a dilemma for Mao Tse-tung, who wanted Communist unity and cohesion but was determined to prevent Soviet hegemony and to maintain the principle of national differences. The principle of Moscow's preeminence was recognized by Peking as late as 1957; but while the Chinese Communists paid lip service to the socialist commonwealth, they carefully remained relatively uninvolved. Peking insisted that unity must not be imposed by fiat. Free federation was permissible as long as it was understood that no member of such a federation could dominate any other member. Subsequently, the disagreements between Moscow and Peking regarding the interpretation of the Communist gospel escalated steadily and finally exploded in the well-known article "Long Live Leninism," published in 1960 in the Chinese theoretical journal *Hong Qui*.

Eight years later, the resuscitation of the

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the writer's "The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations," in *Orbis*, Winter, 1960, p. 429.

commonwealth concept was essential to the Soviet Union's defense of its action in Czechoslovakia. It was a sudden and forceful revival, engineered by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. In his speech to the 23d session of the United Nations General Assembly he reopened the almost closed door of the commonwealth but clearly limited it to the Soviet bloc—i.e., the Soviet Union and the central East European states. The *sodruzhestvo* had become a rather compact unit: "This commonwealth constitutes an inseparable entity cemented by unbreakable ties the like of which history has never before known."<sup>3</sup> In the same speech Gromyko warned:

The Soviet Union deems it necessary to proclaim from this rostrum, too, that the socialist states cannot allow a situation where the vital interests of socialism are infringed upon and encroachments are made on the inviolability of the boundaries of the socialist commonwealth and therefore the foundations of international peace.

In other words, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was a punitive action by the *pater familias* of the commonwealth, the Soviet Union, against one of its children who had dared to pursue a "different road to socialism," along national rather than Communist lines. This was a revamped interpretation of the *sodruzhestvo*. It was no longer voluntary, but virtually restored Stalinist vassalage. With euphemistic terminology, it asserted the right of the U.S.S.R. to intervene if it felt that a socialist state was veering away from the bloc.

Gromyko was wrong in stating that the idea of the socialist commonwealth, i.e., the Soviet bloc, was one that has never been known in history; world history is replete with "communities" of states that were dominated by an overlord nation. The new *sodruzhestvo* no longer primarily indicated an organizational philosophy but had become an instrument with which to reconsolidate East Europe. Moreover, Moscow already had created an East European alliance system consisting of bilateral treaties and the multilateral Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mu-

tual Economic Assistance. The alliances created against Germany during and after World War II were renewed in 1963; East Germany was admitted into the system in 1964. The Kremlin referred to this alliance system as one of the legal bases for action against "counter-revolutionary citizens," without quoting specific articles of the treaties. But the military occupation of Czechoslovakia could hardly be justified on the basis of Article 4 of the Warsaw Pact (in connection with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter).

Another argument for the Warsaw Pact states intervention in Czechoslovakia was the claim that Prague had violated its obligation to defend the alliance. Indeed, the Soviet party newspaper *Pravda* of August 22, 1968, accused the Czechoslovak leaders of having neglected the "active defense of their frontiers" and of striving for a change in the structure of the Warsaw Pact; it was charged that they were possibly considering bolting this alliance. Therefore the security of the socialist countries was endangered.

But far more important than these accusations was a brutally frank Soviet statement of the concept of international law as the Kremlin sees it. This is indeed a fundamental matter that clarifies the U.S.S.R.'s position in international relations. It accentuates the chasm between East and West and demonstrates the Communist insistence on differentiating between two or more international laws. This makes it virtually impossible to develop peaceful coexistence into genuine peace.

## INTERNATIONAL LAWS

Ever since the first codification of international law by the Dutchman Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century, the ideal of a universal law of nations has attracted even non-Western nations. To be sure, international law is not enforceable, because it connotes a voluntary submission of nations to court decisions which they may find unacceptable. Moreover, its principles and tenets have often been violated. Nevertheless, international law is one of the most tangible ways to create

<sup>3</sup> October 3, 1968.

"one world." In Communist interpretation, the law was "bourgeois," and the Bolshevik revolution denigrated it. Obviously, a proletarian dictatorship had legal views different from those of a bourgeois democracy. But the Soviet Union, especially in its early years, was politically isolated and could not afford to live outside the civilized world. It therefore resorted to a tactic by which the Soviet legal concept would be related to

existing international law without comprising Soviet ideology. . . . Could a universal international law embrace both socialism and capitalism? Could devotees of the class struggle submit to laws written by class enemies, even if it served their interests to be protected from international lawlessness?<sup>4</sup>

No clear answer was ever given and adherence to international law was loudly proclaimed—if it suited Soviet purposes. However, the Soviet Union unquestionably sought to create its own international law and exploited crisis situations within the socialist community to demonstrate that Western international law was not applicable in the Soviet bloc. The dualistic character of Soviet foreign policy was thus reflected in international law:

The Soviet approach to the function and purpose of international law reflects the Communist tenet that law must be employed in the building of communism. Specifically, Soviet international law conditions must contribute to the world victory of socialism by providing legal support for the foreign policies and practices of the Soviet Union in pursuit of that goal.<sup>5</sup>

Thus there developed two different concepts of international law in the Soviet Union. One is based on Soviet policies re-

garding relations with non-Communist states; the other is geared to relations within the socialist camp. The former is a kind of conflict management between socialism and capitalism. The latter is designed to achieve the greatest possible cohesion among the members of the socialist commonwealth. "These principles are mutually exclusive in their operation; they are subsumed under the general law of 'peaceful coexistence.'"<sup>6</sup>

There have been numerous books and articles on the Soviet concept of international law by Soviet authors in which the authors employed euphemisms to avoid giving the impression that the Soviet Union had parted company with the existing law of nations. But the invasion of Czechoslovakia for the first time brought forth a brutally frank statement on the limited sovereignty of bloc states; it clarified the different character of international law within the Soviet bloc which now is the heart of the socialist commonwealth. On September 25, 1968, *Pravda* published the article "Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries," which was designed to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on the basis of new Soviet interpretations of international law and the socialist commonwealth. It would be dangerous to shrug off as absurd the tortured dialectic of this article, which presumably will henceforth govern the relations between Moscow and its satellites.<sup>7</sup>

The East European states cannot be regarded as free agents in international affairs and must be considered as part of the Soviet bloc. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, its justification and the implicit threat to Rumania make it clear that the term "satellite" is still applicable.

## SOVIET DUALISM

The Soviets want to have it both ways: they accept traditional international law when it is to their advantage; they reject it when it is not. The universal condemnation of the Soviet interference in Czechoslovakia as a violation of international law is groundless, according to the *Pravda* article, because such reasoning consists primarily of an "ab-

<sup>4</sup> See the writer's "Soviet Foreign Policy: Fifty Years of Dualism" in *The Soviet Union: A Half Century of Communism*, ed. K. London (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 331.

<sup>5</sup> B. A. Ramundo, *Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Ramundo, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> The word "satellite" became unfashionable when it appeared that the East European states were being permitted greater freedom of movement to fashion their internal affairs; the Rumanian image did much to stimulate wishful thinking in the West. For excerpts from the September 25, 1968, article in *Pravda* see pp. 237 ff. of this issue.



stract non-class" approach to the concept of sovereignty and the right of national self-determination. But, while

the peoples of the socialist countries and Communist parties certainly do have and should have freedom for determining the ways of advance for their respective countries . . . none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries, and the whole working class movement, which is working for socialism.<sup>8</sup>

While the Soviet leaders have always professed great concern for the maintenance of the sovereignty and independence of non-Communist countries, they also claim, in the true tradition of Communist dialectics, that the sovereign rights of the nations within the Soviet Union's sphere of interest are limited by the responsibility of these nations not only to their own people but also to all socialist countries and the entire Communist movement. In other words, the independence of a Communist party cannot go so far as to distract it from its international duty. Since "Marxist dialectics is opposed to one-sidedness," *Pravda* pontificates, the sovereignty of a socialist country "cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement." The socialist states respect the "democratic" norms of international law; they have in the past opposed

the attempts of imperialism to violate the sovereignty of the independence of nations. . . . The norms of mutual relations of the socialist countries cannot be interpreted narrowly, formally and in isolation from the general context of the class struggle in the modern world.

This is the crux of the Soviet interpretation of international law applied to the bloc countries and it demonstrates clearly the dualism which has characterized Soviet policy ever since the Bolshevik revolution. It shows the double standard of the Soviet position vis-à-vis the world community, a position which

has the advantage of legally protecting Soviet and other Communist states from outside inter-

ference and at the same time advancing a revolutionary interpretation of self-determination throughout the world. It is the key to understanding Soviet political strategy.<sup>9</sup>

*Pravda* reminds us that Lenin insisted that "each man must choose between joining our side or the other side." Thus a socialist country cannot withdraw from the socialist community although it may retain its national independence supported by the combined might of this community. However, to detach itself completely from the socialist commonwealth would conflict with its own vital interests and would therefore be detrimental to the other socialist states. From this vantage point, Czechoslovakia did not know what was good for her and the bloc. Unimpeded liberalization might well have spilled over into other East European states, might have influenced Communist parties elsewhere and eventually might have affected the Soviet Union itself. Thus the Warsaw Pact allies opposed the Czechoslovak interpretation of self-determination because it would have imperiled the camp and allowed an "anti-socialist degeneration." "Counter-revolutionary elements" in Czechoslovakia were trying to undermine that country's independence—with the help of world imperialism. *Pravda* reached the height of hypocrisy in asserting that the soldiers of the allied socialist countries occupying Czechoslovakia

do not interfere in the internal affairs of the country, are fighting for the principle of self-determination of the people of Czechoslovakia—are fighting for their inalienable right to think out profoundly, decide their fate themselves, without intimidation on the part of counter-revolutionaries, without revisionist and nationalist demagoguery.

Formal juridical reasoning could not be allowed to overshadow a class approach to the problem.

### KREMLIN WARNING

While this reasoning was not new in itself, the Kremlin never before stated it in such unmistakable language. It was a warning to the West not to interfere in Soviet affairs; it was a warning to the satellites not to repeat

<sup>8</sup> "Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries," *Pravda*, September 25, 1968.

<sup>9</sup> London, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

Prague's "mistakes" lest the fate of Hungary and Czechoslovakia befall them. As a result, Rumania, after the visit of the Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky to Bucharest, lessened her show of independence and opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia; Ceausescu, the head of the Rumanian Communist party, seemed to have been forced to agree that the 1969 Warsaw Pact maneuvers might use Rumanian territory. Not until February did Ceausescu make some dissenting noises, denouncing as "un-Marxist" the theory of limited sovereignty. Still, Rumania, which has established some economic and cultural bonds with the West, remains in an extremely delicate position vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. even though the Rumanian party has preserved its Bolshevik character. The Yugoslavs are quite worried about possible Soviet action against Rumania. Poland and East Germany have gone along readily with Soviet policy, as has Bulgaria. Hungary has introduced some minor reforms, slowly and quietly. However, it is doubtful that Hungarian leader Janos Kadar's policy could be tagged as liberalization; it is rather a weak attempt to adjust to the requirements of changing times.

#### **"LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY"**

Leonid Brezhnev's doctrine of limited sovereignty has been a sharp reminder to the West of the nature of Soviet policy. Even the strongest advocates of détente must now recognize where the Kremlin stands. So must the peoples of Eastern Europe whose territories are firmly attached to that of the U.S.S.R. and who are to beware of Western influence. Since there is no such thing as limited sovereignty, the Soviet Union has become the suzerain of these states, and there is little indication that the present or the next generation of Soviet leaders will alter this position. Like the Berlin Wall, the Baltic and East European states separate the West from the East, dividing "imperialism" from "socialism." The Soviet Union will press for integration with the satellites on three interlock-

ing levels: ideology and party, government and politics, and economics. It is now clearer than ever that French President Charles de Gaulle's pre-Czechoslovak-invasion goal of a "Europe to the Urals" is unrealistic. Only after Soviet communism has run its course, or, at least, has modified its most aggressive Marxist-Leninist principles (i.e., the transplantation of the class war to the international scene), can we base policy decisions on imaginary projections. At present

The chief interest of the socialist system must, in substance, coincide with the specific interests of each socialist country to insure that a fruitful and harmonious association between their interests shall ensue. This process can be disturbed when national interests become prominent, and particularly when these interests acquire a "nationalist significance" which is opposed to the interests of socialism. The principle of proletarian internationalism demands that efforts on the part of "inner and outer counter-revolution" which seek to undermine the socialist order must be checked.<sup>10</sup>

Thus at the moment the outlook for the full sovereignty of the East European states is dark indeed. Their relations with the Soviet Union cannot be compared with relations among non-Communist states. Their national aspirations are suppressed by Soviet "proletarian internationalism." They are economically exploited because they remain dependent on Soviet trade. Their armed forces are integrated with those of the Soviet Union and are therefore Moscow-controlled. Their Communist rulers are virtually subject to the policy decisions of the C.P.S.U. The emergence of neo-Stalinism has given new impetus to Communist semicolonialism in East Europe. The only hope for the restitution of full sovereignty to the satellites and their liberation from Soviet imperialism lies in an evolutionary mellowing of the Soviet system which is unlikely to occur soon.

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<sup>10</sup> V. Klimov, "The Unity of International and National Tasks of the Socialist State," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (Moscow), 1968, pp. 13ff.





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*The Johnson administration "policy [of increasing trade with East Europe] enjoyed a lukewarm support in Congress which . . . still tended to look at East Europe in terms of cold war categories. . . . The sense of urgency was accentuated by the fact that the United States initiative in East Europe was being gradually overshadowed by West Europe." After summarizing recent United States policy in the area, this author concludes that "The change of administration in Washington provides a good opportunity to experiment with some fresh approaches to East Europe."*

## East Europe and the United States

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DISCUSSING UNITED STATES policy in East Europe in this journal four years ago I concluded that "while the change in the United States attitude toward East Europe has been rather striking since World War II, its present policy is essentially static and short-run."<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps characteristic of United States policy in that part of the world that this conclusion could easily apply to the situation at the beginning of 1969.

For a number of years United States policy in East Europe was anchored in the dual concept of "bridge building" and "peaceful engagement." These two concepts replaced the earlier doctrine of "liberation" which became thoroughly discredited by United States inaction during the Berlin uprising of 1953 and the Hungarian revolt of 1956. It is interesting to note that whereas the "new look" in United States policy reached its climax during the Democratic administrations of Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, the actual reversal of the cold war policies was undertaken by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the author of the doctrine of liberation in the Republican administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Thus rap-

prochement with East Europe has enjoyed the support of both parties.

The general assumption underlying the new policy can be summarized as follows: after Stalin's death, and especially after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist party, the Moscow-dominated colonial empire has been transformed into a kind of Communist commonwealth. This, in turn, has afforded individual member countries some room for maneuver for the first time since 1948. The Sino-Soviet conflict, the growing economic difficulties in the region, the general thaw in the cold war climate, the apparent inability or unwillingness of Soviet leaders to bring into line some of the dissident members—all these factors combined to convince United States policy-makers that a fresh look at United States policy in East Europe was indeed necessary.

The objectives of the new approach were modest. While in the long run the United States entertained the hope that the Communist regimes might eventually disappear and be replaced by other, more democratic systems, in the short run it was assumed that communism was there to stay. All that the United States could do was to help make the Communist regimes more humane and thus more acceptable to their people, and to make

<sup>1</sup> "U.S. Policy in East Europe," *Current History*, March, 1965.

the individual East European countries more independent of Moscow's control.

The first order of priority consisted of breaking down the Iron Curtain separating East Europe from the rest of the world. This was to be accomplished in three ways—through aid, trade and cultural exchanges which were to form the bridges between East and West. These bridges were to be built peacefully to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union, still the major power in the area. Furthermore, the policy of building bridges was based on the assumption that not all East European countries were to be treated equally: in some cases the bridges were to be wide, in other cases, narrow.

The record of the new policy with regard to aid is not especially impressive. In fact, only two countries—Poland and Yugoslavia—received some aid. Yugoslavia continued to receive the massive economic aid initiated in the early 1950's in order to bolster her strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. United States aid to Poland, on the other hand, represented a significant departure from past practice. After all, Poland was a Communist country which, except for a relatively short period in the late 1950's, remained the principal Soviet ally in East Europe, showing little disposition to seek a more independent course in foreign and domestic policies. Nonetheless, Poland has obtained some \$500 million worth of aid in the form of outright grants and loans, or in credits under Public Law 480, the "Food for Peace" program.

The problem of trade is far more complex. It may be argued that trade offers better pros-

pects for United States involvement in East Europe than aid. In general, foreign aid must be approved annually by Congress; thus it is less freely used as an instrument of rapprochement. The East European countries themselves prefer trade to aid. Trade is in essence politically neutral; aid is invariably thought of as creating a form of dependence which—in the case of East Europe—represents a sensitive political issue.

Thus the second half of the 1960's witnessed a number of studies, papers, reports and recommendations advocating the expansion of trade between the United States and East Europe.<sup>2</sup> While the main impetus came from the Johnson administration, the timing and urgency of the various recommendations were also influenced by difficulties in the United States balance of payments and the fast-growing trade between East Europe and various West European countries which shed their inhibitions about trading with Communist countries several years ahead of the United States.

The programs of cultural and educational exchanges represented a belated effort to learn more about the individual countries, to counteract Soviet influences, to popularize United States achievements in the cultural and educational spheres, to reestablish scientific and artistic contacts, and to impress on the East Europeans the idea that the United States intended to maintain a continuing interest in their fate.

These were the main features of the new policy with regard to East Europe. They were articulated time and again during both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations by various spokesmen, including President Johnson himself who, in October, 1966, presented perhaps the most comprehensive model of the new policy.<sup>3</sup> The advocacy of the new approach was not confined to politicians and government officials. Universities and foundations across the country, business organizations and individual persons interested in East European affairs joined in an impressive and urgent effort to publicize and sell the new policy to the public.<sup>4</sup>

There were some good reasons for this.

<sup>2</sup> See the Committee for Economic Development, *East-West Trade* (1965); "Report to the President" of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union (1965); U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *East-West Trade: Hearings*, 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964; *East-West Trade*, a background study prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (1965); American Management Association, *Financing East-West Business Relations* (1968).

<sup>3</sup> Address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers in New York, October 7, 1966. *The Department of State Bulletin*, October 24, 1966.

<sup>4</sup> For example, the American Assembly sponsored a series of meetings across the country devoted to the general topic of relations between the United States and East Europe.

The new policy enjoyed lukewarm support in Congress which, for all practical purposes, still tended to look at East Europe in terms of cold war categories and which, more often than not, succeeded in offsetting the positive effects of various measures undertaken by the administration.

The sense of urgency was accentuated by the fact that the United States initiative in East Europe was being gradually overshadowed by West Europe—especially France and, to some extent, West Germany. Failure to obtain strong congressional and popular support was likely to result in the slow erosion of United States influence in the area.

There were also signs in East Europe indicating that the area might be entering a new phase characterized by rapid change and instability. Thus it became imperative for the United States to have a clear-cut, unambiguous policy which, among other things, would grant policy-makers the authority to deal with a rapidly changing situation.

On closer examination, however, the sense of urgency and the air of strong commitment proved much more apparent than real. To be sure, the frequency of appeals and recommendations showed no signs of diminishing. Yet their basic sterility gradually became apparent. Ranging all the way from the President to a junior Assistant Secretary of State, the advocates of the “new look” kept repeating the same arguments *ad nauseam*. Possibly as a result of frustration with administration policies, some new and often exciting proposals emerged from university circles, but they were either too radical to be seriously considered or—if they were considered—they were not followed.<sup>5</sup>

### A STERILE POLICY

There were three major reasons for the essential sterility of United States policy

toward East Europe: the relative lack of success of the “new look”; continuing if not hardening Congressional opposition; and the problem of Vietnam.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to judge the effectiveness of a policy except in terms of its objectives. If the objective of the United States was to achieve more autonomy in the foreign and domestic affairs of East European countries, then even prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, the success of the “bridge building” policy was clearly limited. Of course, individual countries did achieve greater independence in their foreign policy and pursued liberalization in their domestic affairs. But the change came about despite, rather than because of, United States policy. Thus, countries which made a sincere effort to rid themselves of the old, discredited policies at home and abroad—Czechoslovakia, Rumania and, to some extent, Hungary—received neither aid nor preferential trade treatment, while the one country which enjoyed both, i.e., Poland, was moving rapidly toward establishing a Communist-fascist system with all its manifestations. Yugoslavia, which also enjoyed favored treatment, continued to balance the two sides.

The need for congressional approval meant that the administration could not contemplate extending aid to countries other than Yugoslavia and Poland, and even in those two cases aid was practically terminated in the mid-1960's. The continuing war in Vietnam and the fact that some of the potential aid recipients (e.g., Czechoslovakia) were supplying North Vietnam with weapons and other aid precluded any chance of congressional approval for extending aid. Since Poland was moving closer to the Soviet Union rather than moving away from it, the possibility of using aid in the future as one of the bridges seemed far removed.<sup>6</sup>

The same was roughly true with regard to cultural exchanges. Here again, the example of Poland illustrates the United States dilemma. During the late 1950's and the early 1960's, hundreds if not thousands of young Polish scholars visited the United States. They seemed to be satisfied with their recep-

<sup>5</sup> For an excellent example of some suggested new approaches, see Z. Brzezinski, *Alternative to Partition* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

<sup>6</sup> There can also be little doubt that the hostile attitude of most East European countries toward Israel following the June, 1967, war, combined with the wave of anti-Semitism in Poland, played a role in stiffening congressional and public resistance to a possible expansion of aid.

tion and their opportunity for study. Yet these same scholars, especially the social scientists, were unable to prevent Poland's drift toward neostalinism. In contrast, the number of young Czechoslovak and Rumanian scholars visiting this country prior to 1968 was insignificant; yet it was precisely these young intellectuals—especially in Czechoslovakia—who stood in the forefront of the recent democratization drive.

The final component of the "bridge building" policy—trade—also mirrors the complexity of United States involvement. On the one hand, in view of its small volume, East-West trade, like aid, is not an economic but a political question and as such it is subject to the same public criticism. Thus Congress, which could influence trade by way of tariff legislation, has been unwilling to expand it. Only two countries—Poland and Yugoslavia—received the most-favored-nation treatment which granted them preferential tariffs not available to other East European countries.

#### TRADE POTENTIAL

On the other hand, the potential of trade as an East-West bridge seems to be greater than aid and cultural exchanges. Even though its volume has been small, it is likely to grow in the future, benefiting American business and contributing to the improvement in the United States balance of payments. Thus, the United States business community has called for the reduction or abolition of various trade restrictions dating back to the period of the cold war.<sup>7</sup>

Various East European countries have also shown a growing interest in trade expansion. In contrast to economic aid, trade with the capitalist world carries much less stigma and the example of the Soviet Union which has also increased its trade with West Europe provides an imprimatur for the smaller Communist countries. There were, however, even more compelling reasons for increasing the volume of trade in the mid-1960's. A number of East European countries were beginning to experience severe economic difficulties. This

is not the place to discuss in detail the causes of these difficulties, reflected in a considerable slowing down of the rate of growth, increasing balance of payments difficulties, the appearance of covert and overt unemployment, shortages of food and consumer goods and growing inflationary pressures. Most of these countries blamed their difficulties on the continuing existence of the Stalinist economic model which became dysfunctional once the industrial base was laid and the available domestic resources, especially labor, were fully utilized. The result was a series of more or less comprehensive economic reforms aimed at creating new economic models combining elements of planning and market mechanisms.

One of the chief problems facing the East European nations was the modernization of industry. Even in the most industrialized countries, such as Czechoslovakia, industry was considered to be at least 20 years behind that of West Europe. In order to modernize their industry, East Europe needed not only modern machinery and equipment but also the modern techniques of management and know-how which could come only from the West, especially from the United States. Once East European industry was brought up to the level of West Europe, its products could then compete successfully on world markets and pay for additional imports of Western technology. Until then, however, East Europe could only hope to be able to export its traditional commodities—food and raw materials—or, failing that, to obtain aid or long-term credits.

Clearly, the United States was faced with a difficult problem. American goods were very much in demand in East Europe but there was little that the United States could purchase in return. In contrast, West Germany, France and Great Britain were in a much more favorable situation, able to supply necessary goods and to provide a large expanding market for East European exports. The only solution for the United States was to try to maximize its imports from East Europe by removing all possible barriers, such as punitive tariffs and quotas, and by granting long-term credits.

Only Congress could grant the administra-

<sup>7</sup> *East-West Trade Hearings, passim.*



tion the authority to remove or reduce trade obstacles. Not only did Congress refuse to do so, but in addition it either acted, or threatened to act, to impose new restrictions on East-West trade,<sup>8</sup> largely because of the war in Vietnam. Congressional frustration with the conduct of the war slowly hardened resistance against administration requests in general, and against requests for closer ties with East Europe in particular. To many congressmen, world communism still appeared as the traditional Stalinist monolith. They regarded the war in Vietnam as a war against world communism; any concessions, however trivial, were regarded as helpful to the enemies of the United States. The fact that various East European countries were actively aiding North Vietnam did not improve the climate of congressional opinion, which was intensified by the extra-parliamentary opposition coming from such organizations as the John Birch Society and the Young Americans for Freedom, which organized boycotts of goods of East European origin.<sup>9</sup>

It would be altogether too easy, however, to put the entire blame on Congress. The administration itself shared the guilt despite its apparent enthusiastic commitment to "peaceful engagement" in East Europe. Not only was there little or no attempt made to follow through on the various recommendations to Congress, but it soon became clear that the administration's own commitment was in reality half-hearted.

Here again the major culprit was the war in Vietnam, which was obviously receiving top priority. But while both East and West Europe might be said to have been equally neglected by United States decision-makers, one additional element contributed greatly to the *immobilisme* that has characterized recent United States policy in East Europe. This was the Johnson administration's apparent determination to enlist Soviet support to end the war in Southeast Asia. Rightly or

wrongly, President Johnson believed that the key to the termination of the war was in Moscow and he was prepared to do his best not to alienate the Soviet Union. Regardless of the official United States declarations that the policy of "bridge building" was not directed against the U.S.S.R., the Soviet leaders were less than enthusiastic about United States involvement in East Europe. Thus the administration's overwhelming desire for Soviet help in ending the Vietnamese conflict, combined with the relatively unimpressive effects of the "bridge building" policy, resulted in a quantitative and qualitative change in its policy toward East Europe.

### A CHANGING POLICY

The United States attitude toward Czechoslovakia provides a perfect illustration of this new tendency. In early 1968, United States-Czechoslovak relations could hardly have been described as cordial. Despite signs of an impending crisis, Czechoslovakia was by and large considered one of the most faithful Soviet satellites. Her role as a supplier of military hardware to North Vietnam and the Middle East, reinforced by the overtly anti-Western policy of the Antonin Novotny regime, apparently convinced Washington that there was little sense in building bridges to Prague. Consequently, in the areas of trade and cultural exchange, Czechoslovakia found herself far behind such countries as Poland and Rumania.

The emergence of the Alexander Dubcek regime in January, 1968, followed by the rapid democratization of political life, made hardly a dent in the rigid United States posture. There was no visible improvement in the political and economic relations between the two countries, except for a greater tourist flow and some expansion in cultural exchanges. The United States refused to give

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<sup>8</sup> Thus in February, 1968, the Congress passed new restrictions on the ability of the Export-Import Bank to finance East-West trade.

<sup>9</sup> For the administration's position, see "Private Boycotts versus the National Interest," *The Department of State Bulletin*, September 26, 1966.

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Andrzej Korbonski is the author of *Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965) and *COMECON* (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1964).

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*"Hungary, in 1956, and Czechoslovakia, in 1968, showed that the Soviet Union was willing to use force to preserve intact its sphere of influence in East Europe. Depending on the political constellation in control in the Kremlin at any given time, it is prepared to accept a measure of liberalization, but the line of what is permissible is liable to continual restraint and re-delineation."*

## Czechoslovakia in Transition

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

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ANOTHER ACT IN the tragedy of modern Czechoslovakia ended on August 21, 1968, with the occupation of the country by Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies.\* A few weeks later, Alexander Dubcek, the Czechoslovak party leader newly released from temporary incarceration in the Kremlin, appeared on television and asked his countrymen to avoid antagonizing Moscow, in the hope that the occupation might end soon and a new beginning be made toward improving life: "We must really avoid all the excesses which could complicate and hinder our development." The process of "normalization" began with attacks on the Czech reformers and the reimposition of censorship.

The enthusiasm and exhilarating expectations of the period from January to August, 1968, are gone, leaving Czechoslovak citizens with only the faint hope that the quality of life will not in the near future revert to that of the drab, fearful years under Antonin Novotny, Moscow's puppet who was removed as Czechoslovakia's President and party boss by the reformers in early 1968. That he has not been reinstated in power is tacit acknowledgment by the Soviet Union of the bankruptcy of its former satrap, but this is scarcely recompense for the suppression of social democracy.

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\* *Ed. note:* For a discussion of events leading to the occupation, see *Current History*, November, 1968, pp. 263 ff.

Before discussing recent developments in Czechoslovakia and their implications for the future, it may be useful to review briefly the background of the Czechoslovak liberation and the reasons for the Soviet invasion.

The Allied victory in 1945 brought short-lived joy to Czechoslovakia. As Soviet-Western hostility grew, Josef Stalin institutionalized Soviet rule over East Europe. The Communist coup in February, 1948, signalled the end of the democratic experiment in Czechoslovakia. Under the harsh rule of pro-Moscow Czechoslovak Communists, the economy was exploited for the benefit of the Soviet Union; political, religious, and intellectual freedom was ended; and a pall of Kafkaesque fear lay upon the nation. Even Stalin's death in March, 1953, and the beginning of destalinization elsewhere in the Soviet empire did not help the Czechs very much because their leaders—old-guard Stalinists who dreaded reform—were skilled in the ways of bureaucratic obstructionism and retained the support of the conservatives in Moscow.

However, by the early 1960's, economic stagnation and social alienation, as well as dissatisfaction with the Novotny clique, aroused nationalist factions within the party: they shared a desire to revive the Czechoslovak economy and reform the Stalinist party machine. A coalition of economic reformers (sparked by Professor Ota Sik) and intellectuals, both Slovaks and Czechs, united to de-

pose the entrenched pro-Moscow bureaucrats in the party, government and trade unions. Novotny fought back: he toed Moscow's line in condemning Israel during the Middle East war and exploited anti-Semitism to discredit his opponents. He cracked down on the writers and social critics, manhandled the student protesters, and tried the shopworn ploy of pitting Czechs against Slovaks. On all counts, the Novotny wing of the Czechoslovak Communist party failed. Not even visits to Prague in late 1967 from Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev could stem the tide.

In January, 1968, Alexander Dubcek replaced Antonin Novotny as General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist party. By mid-February, the skepticism among the population at large changed to hopeful anticipation. By late spring, the air of freedom intoxicated the country: Dubcek and the reformers spoke of a Parliament free from party control; they rehabilitated the victims of the Stalinist past, began to rid the party and trade unions of the front-men for the Russians, and eliminated censorship. Ludvik Svoboda replaced Novotny as President. In the Central Committee, the Dubcek group was in control. Democratization flowered.

### ELYSIAN INTERLUDE

From early February to August 20, 1968, Czechoslovakia experienced a rebirth of political, cultural and religious freedom. The secret police were stripped of their arbitrary powers; links to the Soviet police apparatus were exposed; criticisms of the past and proposals for the future were aired with a candor and passion that disturbed the oligarchs of Byzantine communism in Moscow.

Through the spring and early summer, the Soviet Union bitterly attacked the Dubcek group for tolerating "slandorous" criticisms of the Soviet Union. In June, it used Warsaw Pact military maneuvers as a lever to try to sidetrack the reformers from the liberalization path they had chosen. But the Czechs persisted: they spoke again of Thomas Masaryk, the father of modern Czechoslovakia who had been consigned by the Soviet Union to the perdition of the capitalist past;

they freed the churches; and permitted travel abroad. In late June, 1968, a declaration of democratization, called "Two Thousand Words," was published: it condemned the Communist party for betraying the people, for turning the party into a "power-hungry organization attracting egotists, cowards and crooks," for stifling honest discussion and debasing personal and collective standards of honor and rewards on the basis of ability. Though the Dubcek government did not formally support the declaration, it did nothing to curb the writers, thereby leading Moscow to suspect complicity.

Soviet leaders were disturbed, in particular, by three aspects of the liberalization: 1) an open call from intellectuals for a multiparty system, in effect for an end to the monopoly of political power enjoyed by the Communist party; 2) the end of censorship, which had given rise to a surgical delving into the seamy side of Soviet rule; and 3) the call for revision of the Warsaw Pact—the Soviet military alliance system which enables Moscow to impose limits on the autonomy of the East European countries. On numerous occasions Dubcek tried to allay Soviet fears that communism in Czechoslovakia was in any imminent danger or that the party would lose control over events as it did in 1956 in Hungary:

I am convinced that our friends will understand—even if not at once—that the Czechoslovak socialist regeneration process does not threaten the interests of the socialist Communist countries.

But Soviet leaders did not "understand" and were not reassured by the meetings at Cierna and Bratislava in late July and August; they saw anti-Soviet forces in the ascendancy in Czechoslovakia and were uneasy over the consequences of this liberalization in Czechoslovakia for their own political system.

In the early hours of August 21, 1968, Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia. Joined by Polish, East German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian divisions, they quickly occupied the country. Two days later, Moscow installed three Czech puppets in office, only to remove them a few days later in the face of massive passive resistance from the entire nation. Czech and Slovak stood as one. President

Ludvik Svoboda, long a trusted man in Moscow—indeed, he had been decorated by the Soviet Union for his role in fighting against the Germans in World War II—was summoned to the Kremlin, presumably to accept surrender terms. However, he confounded the Soviets by his obduracy and obtained the release of Dubcek, Josef Smrkovsky, and other liberals as a pre-condition for serious talks. Perceiving the total failure of its three Communist quislings (Drahomir Kolder, Vasil Bilak and Alois Indra), the Soviet Union relented.

From the very beginning, the U.S.S.R. was exposed and discredited by its own lies: it said Soviet troops were sent at the request of party and government officials, but Svoboda, Dubcek and Oldrich Cernik denied—and have continued to deny—this allegation; it claimed to have acted to forestall an insidious effort at counterrevolution, but the collapse of its quisling regime showed that what was in jeopardy in Czechoslovakia was Soviet domination, not socialism; it resorted to slander and anti-Semitism to tarnish such Czech reformers as Ota Sik and Jiri Hajek, but muted some of these charges when they became counterproductive. Faced with a nation aroused, united and anti-Russian, the Soviet Union moved slowly but relentlessly to translate its military supremacy into political control.

### WHY INVASION?

Why did Soviet leaders feel impelled to try to solve their Czechoslovak problem by force? They were apparently willing to forego many of their policy goals: for example, a limited détente with the United States, including a non-proliferation treaty; the steady erosion, and possibly the imminent disappearance, of NATO; the support of foreign Communist parties, many of whom have publicly condemned the Soviet aggression against an ally and fellow-Communist country; and the propaganda advantage of castigating the United States for its policy of force in Vietnam. Several reasons may be tentatively advanced.

The first relates to the domestic situation in the Soviet Union. This may have been the most important single determinant. We tend

to overlook the ethnic and racial diversity of the U.S.S.R. and the profound effect that this has on Soviet politics and policy-making. The Russians represent no more than 55 per cent of the population. The second largest nationality group are the 40 million Ukrainians who have been a source of trouble for Moscow for more than 300 years. Of all the peoples in East Europe, the Czechs and Slovaks are regarded by Ukrainians as the nearest to them in tradition and culture. The rulers of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) may well have been afraid that the virus of Czechoslovak liberalization would find a congenial breeding ground in the national consciousness of the Ukrainians and stimulate demands in the Ukrainian S.S.R. for greater autonomy and liberalization. After all, if the Slavs and fraternal Communists of Czechoslovakia were permitted democratization, why not those of the Soviet Union?

That such a line of reasoning loomed large in Kremlin calculations—perhaps more so than is generally appreciated in the West—may be inferred from the important role played in the Czechoslovak crisis by Pyotr Y. Shelest, the Ukrainian party boss. Shelest and his lieutenants have been waging a relentless campaign against ideological laxness, Ukrainian particularism, and “the putrid theories spread by hostile propaganda about the necessity of a ‘democratization’ and a ‘liberalization’ of socialism.” They have inveighed often against the “insidious” cultural influences spreading in the U.S.S.R. from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. Ethnic nationalism is a perennial nightmare for Moscow. Soviet leaders espouse the notion of “proletarian internationalism” abroad to justify Soviet claims to leadership of the international Communist movement; but ironically, they may be more concerned with its acceptance internally as ideological justification for Russian domination over the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union.

Reinforcing our hypothesis of the importance of nationality considerations is the post-Khrushchev trend toward neo-Stalinism in the Soviet Union. Soviet political leaders



climbed to power through the party bureaucracy. Their fundamental approach to social dissonance is defensive, provincial, repressive. The oligarchs in the Kremlin are anxious authoritarians. Lacking political vision and preoccupied with bureaucratic infighting, they are uncomfortable with change and prefer to tinker with familiar institutions and solutions rather than to introduce new ones, an attitude as clearly evident in their approach to dissident intellectuals as it is in their approach to economics. To cope with the growing independence of its uncowed "creative intelligentsia" and to tighten control over the general population, the Soviet government has reestablished the Ministry of Interior, which was abolished by Nikita Khrushchev in 1960 as part of his destalinization policy. It has begun to jam Western radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union for the first time in five years. The "faceless bureaucrats" in the party are not unaware of the role that widespread alienation and opposition among the intellectuals and students played in undermining the Czarist system of rule; they are trying to prune the unwanted growths of liberalization and keep discontent under hot-house control.

A second major factor in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia was the pressure of the military to safeguard the Soviet strategic-military position in Central Europe. The Czech suggestion in July, 1968, that the Warsaw Pact should be revised raised the ghost of another Hungarian crisis. The military no doubt argued that Czechoslovakia was too important geographically to allow for political ambiguity or instability. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that Soviet intelligence assured the political leadership that the Czechs would not fight and that the affair could be handled swiftly and satisfactorily if overwhelming force were applied.

The military favored invasion because they opposed any weakening of their strategic position in East Europe. Warsaw Pact maneuvers in 1966 had exposed glaring weaknesses along the Czechoslovak-West German border. Prague's unwillingness to agree to the permanent stationing of Soviet troops on Czech soil

was an objection the Soviet military wished to override, irrespective of political repercussions abroad. East German leaders added fuel to this view, arguing that if Czechoslovakia opened her economy to Western investment and technology and established diplomatic relations with West Germany, as Rumania and Yugoslavia had, the net result would be a severe weakening of East Germany, the Soviet Union's most reliable satellite and most important economic partner in East Europe.

Therefore, strategic reasons, as well as the fear of the Soviet leaders of the consequences of Czechoslovak liberalization for Soviet political development, impelled the Soviet Union to act in Czechoslovakia as it had in Hungary 12 years earlier. Moscow moved to preserve its sphere of influence for both strategic and domestic reasons. Spheres of influence may rankle the idealists, but they are a fact of international politics.

## POST-INVASION DEVELOPMENTS

An air of paradox and suspended expectation of the worst has prevailed since August 21, 1968. Censorship was quickly reimposed, but it has been largely self-regulating: untruths of Soviet propagandists are countered openly (though this, too, may soon end). For example, in late October, the Soviets circulated a "White Paper," alleging that the August, 1968, invasion had been necessary to save Czechoslovakia from a counterrevolutionary takeover. The Czechs not only rebutted the allegations, point by point, in a series of radio, television and newspaper analyses, but the Institute of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences prepared and distributed a "Black Book" in early December which systematically refutes the Soviet explanation of the invasion. The bulk of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces have left the country, but the Soviet Union has not as yet removed from power the key leaders whose policies presumably prompted it to invade in the first place. The U.S.S.R. expected to find ready collaborationists, in part by playing off Czech against Slovak, but the unity of the Czechoslovak nation has never

been greater and, for the moment at least, has stymied Soviet efforts.

Pending the purging of reformist elements and the reascendancy of conservative, pro-Soviet officials to positions of power, Moscow has repeatedly forced the postponement of the 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist party. The Congress was originally scheduled for September, 1968, at which time Dubcek hoped to remove the Muscovite-Novotnyites from the Central Committee, thereby reducing Soviet influence. Convocation of the Congress now awaits a reshuffling of party cadres to provide the Soviet Union with delegates who will be prepared to promote the Kremlin's policy of "normalization."

Under the treaty ratified by both governments on October 18, 1968, the Soviet Union obtained legal sanction for the stationing of its troops in Czechoslovakia. It has similar treaties of *diktat* with East Germany, Hungary and Poland, thus providing the Soviets with the ultimate weapon for political control, notwithstanding Article 2 of the treaty which states: "Soviet troops do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic."

In the political realm, extensive discussions have been held, with the Soviets insisting on acceptance of their terms and interpretations, which the Czechs nominally accept but actually try to bend to preserve some of their liberalization gains. According to a communiqué issued in Moscow on October 4, 1968,<sup>1</sup> Czechoslovak delegates (Dubcek, Cernik and Gustav Husak) agreed to the following: a) the strengthening of the party's role in all sectors of public life; b) the elimination of "antisocialist" (i.e., anti-Soviet) forces; c) the regulation of all the mass information media in the interests of socialism (i.e., the Soviet Union); and d) the staffing of party and state organs "with men firmly adhering to positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism" (i.e., Soviet overlordship).

Travel curbs have been imposed; the more outspoken magazines have been suspended; reformers have been edged out of second-

echelon positions in government, the party and education; and men like Dubcek and Smrkovsky are losing authority to Cernik, Husak and Lubomir Strougal, who are more acceptable to Moscow. In some essentials, however, Moscow has thus far (in early 1969) refrained from enforcing total submission: some criticism is publicly expressed; organizations of writers, artists and journalists eschew the safety of silence; student groups are defiant; and trade unions refuse to turn out representatives who have been elected to the Workers' Council. But in recent warnings of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist party to the country to cease agitating for liberalization, there are the portents of harsher days ahead. One reason for the Soviet Union's relative patience is its expectation that the feeling of unity between the Czechs and Slovaks, inadvertently forged by Soviet pressure, will dissipate once nationality preoccupations come to the fore.

A federation of Czechs and Slovaks was created on January 1, 1969. Conceived of when Dubcek (a Slovak) was made the head of the Communist party a year before, it creates two separate republics—the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic—within a common federal structure. Dubcek and the reformers intended it to satisfy the persisting desire of the four million Slovaks for greater autonomy and thereby to reconcile them to the ten million Czechs who have dominated the country politically since its establishment in 1918. The U.S.S.R. sanctioned the federation to manipulate nationality animosities and ambitions.

As always in Communist countries, power and political in-fighting are concentrated in the party, where palace coalitions form in response to personal rivalries, as well as to issues. Though Dubcek, as the First Secretary, ostensibly remains the top man in the Czechoslovak Communist party, the Russians would like to see him removed. Two men whose positions on fundamental issues seem more acceptable to Moscow and who are regarded as cool toward the Dubcek-Smrkovsky reformist wing are Lubomir Strougal, head of the Czech Affairs Bureau of the Central Commit-

<sup>1</sup> For text of communiqué, see p. 238 of this issue.

tee, and Gustav Husak, the Secretary of the Slovak Communist party.

## OBSERVATIONS

In July, 1968, U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell, a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, returned from a study mission to Czechoslovakia and issued a report in which he stated:

It should be obvious to Soviet leaders that an intervention involving naked armed force would be a most damaging blow to their relations with the United States, as well as to East-West détente in Europe.

By its use of force, the Soviet Union harshly disproved the optimistic assumptions of Czechoslovak reformers and Western "détentists." Moscow showed that it would not be deterred from taking action against liberal Communists by considerations of prestige among foreign Communist parties; nor would it, out of a desire for improved relations with the United States, passively tolerate what it perceived as a threatening erosion of its political-strategic hold over a contiguous Communist country.

In Moscow's indifference to the opinion of foreign Communists one sees again the dominance of Russian national and imperial interests over the needs and wishes of Communist parties abroad. For example, at the time of the Soviet invasion, Luigi Longo, the Secretary General of the Italian Communist party, was in Moscow. No one bothered to inform him of the invasion. On hearing of it, he went immediately to the headquarters of the Central Committee and demanded to see a top official to find out what was happening. He was informed that "the leaders were too busy to see him." Furious and frustrated, he returned to Rome. So much for Soviet regard for foreign Communists.

Hungary, in 1956, and Czechoslovakia, in 1968, showed that the Soviet Union was willing to use force to preserve intact its sphere of influence in East Europe. Depending on the political constellation in control in the Kremlin at any given time, it is prepared to accept a measure of liberalization, but the line of what is permissible is liable to con-

tinual restraint and redelineation. The behavior of Great Powers reveals no readiness to bargain with weaker nations on a plane of equality. The United States was no more willing to risk a war over Czechoslovakia than was the Soviet Union to risk war over Cuba, the Dominican Republic or Vietnam.

Soviet foreign policy is shaped by a variety of domestic determinants and rivalries about which we still know very little. The destalinization of the Khrushchev period has given way to the neostalinism of the Brezhnev-Kosygin period. The lot of the average citizen has improved since Stalin's death, but decisions are the prerogative of the party-military oligarchy. The suppression of Czechoslovakia has its counterpart in Soviet domestic life.

One consequence of the Soviet invasion has been to give NATO a new lease on life. The vulnerability of West Europe to Soviet conventional forces was glaringly exposed when 500,000 Soviet troops invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia in less than 24 hours. Proposals for a mutual "thinning-out" of United States and Soviet forces from West and East Europe, respectively, must be reevaluated anew: can there be a balanced reduction which would not leave West Europe mortgaged to Soviet goodwill, or leave the Soviet Union free to dominate East Europe? Probably not. The Gaullist vision of an end to formal military blocs in a Europe to be led by a Franco-Soviet entente has lost much of its attractiveness.

The reimposition of Soviet control in Czechoslovakia does not mean that the U.S.S.R.'s troubles are over or that it once again has a reliable Communist leadership there to do its bidding. On the contrary, the

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*"All indications are that the invasion of Czechoslovakia took the Yugoslavs completely by surprise. More significant, however, was the extent to which it blasted their hopes for general bloc acceptance of the new status quo."*

## Yugoslavia: The Diplomacy of Balance

BY STEPHEN S. ANDERSON

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THE SOVIET-LED invasion of Czechoslovakia on the night of August 21, 1968, took most of the world's leaders by surprise, including President (Josip Broz) Tito of Yugoslavia, who had returned from an official visit to that beleaguered but defiant country only a week earlier. More than surprise, however, Tito must have felt acute disappointment, for the invasion constituted a serious setback for Yugoslav diplomacy.

Communist Yugoslavia emerged from World War II closely allied with the Soviet Union. In 1948, however, she was expelled from the Soviet bloc for refusing to accept Josef Stalin's dictates, and since that time her foreign policy has had one central objective: to maintain a middle position between the extremes of isolation and subjugation in the international arena. The Yugoslav leadership has felt strongly that only in this way could it acquire the freedom of action and the economic resources necessary for the construction of a genuinely Yugoslav form of communism.

This "diplomacy of balance" has in practice meant a three-way orientation in international politics: toward the East, toward the West, and toward the Third World. In each direction, the Yugoslavs reach out for relationships that will enhance their security and promote their development.

Although emphatically not a member of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia has nonetheless maintained a lively interest in its affairs, not

only seeking normalization of relations with all Communist nations, but also trying to promote trends within the bloc which make it less likely and less able to threaten her. Again and again, this has placed Yugoslavia on the side of Communist leaders attempting to liberalize domestic policies and loosen their bonds to the Soviet Union.

The Yugoslavs have also devoted considerable attention to the Western democracies, not so much in the hope of influencing their internal affairs or the ties that bind them together, as in the hope of developing the extensive trade and aid relations needed to maintain the forward momentum of Yugoslavia's economic development. In this connection, it should be pointed out that in recent years approximately 60 per cent of Yugoslav trade has been with the West, 30 per cent with East Europe and the Soviet Union, and 10 per cent with the Third World. Although her leaders would very much like to expand the last category, economic necessity forces them toward those more highly-developed nations capable of meeting Yugoslavia's needs for capital goods and of absorbing the output of her agriculture and industry.

The low level of Third World trade has not precluded extensive political contacts with those "developing nations" which refuse to align themselves with the Great Powers. Convinced that international tensions can be reduced—and Yugoslavia's own position enhanced—through the combined efforts of



these nonaligned nations, Tito and his colleagues have been trying for years to join with them in a loose association. So far, two major Conferences of Non-Aligned Nations have been held, under the joint sponsorship of Yugoslavia, India and the U.A.R. The first was in Belgrade, in 1961, and the second in Cairo, in 1964. While not impressive in their results, these conferences demonstrate the scope of Yugoslav interest and contact with the Third World.

Such are the main lines of Yugoslavia's diplomacy. Committing herself fully to no bloc or grouping, she seeks a constantly fluctuating point of equilibrium amidst the powerful opposing forces that characterize contemporary international politics.

This is a sound policy and, in general, it has been well executed and effective. But it is not immune to sudden strain caused by events over which the Yugoslav leadership has little or no control. The invasion of Czechoslovakia last summer was precisely such an event, and its consequences for Yugoslav diplomacy will be felt for some time to come.

## DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY

Before analyzing that event, it will be useful to consider certain related developments during 1968. The first of these concerns domestic affairs, and the point to be made is simply that 1968 was not a year of great internal challenge to the regime. Intraparty conflict was minimal, perhaps due to the expulsion of some 400 obstinately conservative League\* members in late 1967.<sup>1</sup> The economic reforms initiated three years earlier<sup>2</sup> continued in an orderly manner, although with mixed results. Industrial production and national income grew satisfactorily, by

\* The Communist party in Yugoslavia is designated the "Yugoslav League of Communists."

<sup>1</sup> *East Europe* (New York), February, 1968, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> See my "Economic Reform in Yugoslavia," *Current History*, April, 1967, pp. 214-219.

<sup>3</sup> "Yugoslav Economy at the End of 1968," *Yugoslav News Bulletin* (New York), January 9, 1969, pp. 5-6; see also *East Europe*, Vol. 17, No. 6, p. 38.

<sup>4</sup> *East Europe*, December, 1968.

<sup>5</sup> *Keessing's Contemporary Archives* (London), January, 1968, p. 22540.

6 per cent and 5 per cent respectively, but exports did not, and unemployment, at 7.2 per cent of the labor force, remained a very serious problem.<sup>3</sup>

Student riots very similar to those occurring in France, Germany and the United States—and arising from similar grievances—rocked Belgrade University and other educational centers in June, but were contained when Tito came out in favor of most of the student demands and promised immediate and long-term reforms. A manifestation of Yugoslavia's latent national minority problem occurred in the fall, in the form of Albanian-inspired demonstrations among their ethnic counterparts across the border. This problem, too, was met with promises of greater autonomy and more rapid economic betterment for Yugoslavia's Albanian minority.<sup>4</sup>

Other than these events, however, there is very little one can point to in the way of domestic turmoil during 1968. In contrast to earlier years, Yugoslavia's leaders were able to devote themselves primarily to foreign policy.

## FOREIGN POLICY, 1968

Turning now to this foreign policy, let us look first at Yugoslavia's effort to promote her interests in the West. In early January, 1968, West Germany and Yugoslavia resumed diplomatic relations, broken 11 years earlier over Yugoslavia's recognition of East Germany. The Yugoslavs had long desired this resumption, but had refused to pay the price of severing relations with East Germany, and in the end it was the West Germans who gave in. In their joint statement announcing the resumption, both nations expressed the hope that it would make a "positive contribution to the process of détente in Europe."<sup>5</sup> Subsequent economic talks sought to lay the groundwork for increased trade with West Germany, already one of Yugoslavia's major trading partners in the West.

Also during January, Yugoslav Prime Minister Mika Spiljak paid an official visit to Italy and the Vatican, the first such visit since the end of World War II. More than

mere formalities were involved, for Spiljak signed an agreement with Italian Premier Aldo Moro on the sharing of sub-Adriatic oil reserves between Italy and Yugoslavia.<sup>6</sup> During the spring of 1968, Yugoslavia began attending (in observer status) technical meetings of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This paralleled a similar arrangement with the E.E.C. (European Economic Community) begun several years earlier, for the same purpose: to seek better trade terms in West Europe by means short of full affiliation with the trading groups. Such affiliation would violate Yugoslavia's nonaligned stance.

During the first half of 1968, a number of joint ventures with West European and United States firms were launched, again following a pattern established several years earlier. To cite just one example: in May, 1968, a European-American petroleum construction company and the Yugoslav *Naftgas* Combine announced a joint project to construct and maintain pipelines in Yugoslavia and other European countries, with the Yugoslav firm providing 51 per cent of the working capital.<sup>7</sup>

It should be noted that similar agreements were being concluded with East European and Soviet firms—another example of the diplomacy of balance.

A second area of Yugoslav initiative in the early part of 1968 was the Third World. This was demonstrated by two extended goodwill trips made by President Tito, in February and March. His first trip included visits to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Cambodia, India, Ethiopia and the U.A.R. Upon his return, Tito noted that he had become convinced that

the statesmen of these countries consider it necessary to strengthen the activity of the non-aligned countries in order to oppose the policy of force and interference which threatens the independence of nations and peace in the world.<sup>8</sup>

The second trip took Tito to Japan, Mongolia and Iran. While in Tokyo, he an-

nounced that preparations were under way for a third Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, to be held sometime in 1969. Returning from Japan, he stopped in Moscow to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, two other top Yugoslav leaders were visiting a number of African countries to promote the proposed Conference. In May, it was announced that over 80 countries had been contacted by the Yugoslav government and, in June, that 47 of them had accepted invitations to a July planning session in Ethiopia, where the conference would eventually be held. Especially close contact was being maintained with India and Egypt, Yugoslavia's key partners in convening the earlier conferences. Yugoslav relations with the latter had been extremely close ever since the June, 1967, Middle East war, which Tito condemned as an act of Western imperialism-by-proxy. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser met with Tito for several days in mid-July on his way back from talks with the Soviet leadership.


It was at about this time, however, that the Czechoslovak crisis began to obtrude upon Yugoslav diplomacy, a condition that was to persist for the balance of the year. By the end of June, it was clear that events in Czechoslovakia were leading to a major challenge to the Yugoslav strategy of encouraging liberalization and polycentrism within the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia had, of course, given hearty endorsement to the surge of liberalization that began in Czechoslovakia with the ouster of the aging Stalinist leader, Antonin Novotny, in January, 1968, and the elevation of the young Slovak pragmatist, Alexander Dubcek. The intensity of this support became apparent in April, in response to growing criticism of Dubcek's domestic reforms by Soviet, East German and Polish spokesmen. Yugoslav comment was uniformly positive, even enthusiastic. A statement in *Borba*, the official Yugoslav party organ, noted on April 21,<sup>9</sup> "The process of democratization unfolding in Czechoslovakia offers sufficient guarantee that its aims can be realized." In May, Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Marko Nikezic paid a three-day

<sup>6</sup> *East Europe*, February, 1968, p. 38.


<sup>7</sup> *Yugoslav News Bulletin*, May 31, 1968, p. 8.

<sup>8</sup> *Yugoslav News Bulletin*, February 14, 1968, p. 2.


<sup>9</sup> Quoted in *East Europe*, June, 1968, p. 32.



# **YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS PROVINCES**



## **KEY**



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visit to Czechoslovakia, concluding with a public declaration of his confidence in the ability of the Czechoslovak party and people to handle their own affairs.<sup>10</sup>

As Soviet-bloc pressure against Czechoslovakia mounted during July and August, so did Yugoslav support. On July 16, immediately after the ominous gathering of all but the Czechoslovak and Rumanian Warsaw Pact\*\* leaders, the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists issued a statement which said in part:<sup>11</sup>

... any outside action that would mean interference or an attempt to limit the independence of the Czechoslovak Communist party and might in any way threaten the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia would have serious consequences for the development of socialism in Czechoslovakia and in the world. Any such action would amount to support for the conservative and reactionary forces in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere.

Three days later Tito himself, in a widely publicized interview, stated flatly that it would be a serious mistake if other countries were to interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia.<sup>12</sup>

Thereafter events moved swiftly. The dramatic confrontation of the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaderships at Cierna seemed to vindicate the Czechoslovak viewpoint, and was thus a victory for Yugoslav diplomacy. It was rumored that Tito himself had intervened in the negotiations, in the form of a strongly worded letter of support for Dubcek.<sup>13</sup> The subsequent Bratislava "ratification" conference raised even higher Yugoslav hopes for general bloc acceptance of the Czechoslovak position. Shortly after the Bratislava Conference, Tito journeyed to Prague, where he

received massive popular acclaim and issued a series of supportive and congratulatory statements. From this visit until the invasion nine days later, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were virtual allies. As Tito said in his farewell speech in Prague: "Friendship between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and their peoples is so great that there is no need for any formal treaties."<sup>14</sup>

All indications are that the invasion of Czechoslovakia took the Yugoslavs completely by surprise. More significant, however, was the extent to which it blasted their hopes for general bloc acceptance of the new status quo. Buttressed by the subsequent Soviet enunciation, in September, of the doctrine that the internal affairs of each member of the socialist commonwealth are the legitimate concern of all other members, the invasion conclusively demonstrated the extent of Soviet, East German, Polish and Bulgarian willingness to exclude Yugoslav influence from East Europe. Nor was that all, for beyond the destruction of the emerging Yugoslav-Czechoslovak partnership appeared the far more sinister threat of some kind of bloc action against Rumania, Yugoslavia's neighbor, and the only Soviet bloc nation which had supported Czechoslovakia and refused to participate in the invasion. A military occupation of Rumania would isolate Yugoslavia completely, except for her Western and Third World ties, and could presage an invasion of Yugoslavia herself.

To add to the Yugoslavs' apprehensions, Soviet military maneuvers were held during the next few weeks along the Rumanian border, and several Soviet divisions were transferred to Bulgaria, which until then had not had any Soviet troops on her soil. Bulgaria, in turn, began to intensify her agitation over the age-old Macedonian Question—the demand that Yugoslav Macedonia be returned to its "rightful owner," Bulgaria. The Soviet, Polish, East German and Bulgarian press launched bitter attacks against Yugoslavia and against Tito personally, accusing him of having inspired the revisionist activity which had made intervention in Czechoslovakia necessary.<sup>15</sup>

\*\* The Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Albania. At the time Albania was still a member, but had been inactive for several years. She withdrew formally in September, 1968. Yugoslavia was never a member.

<sup>10</sup> *Yugoslav Life* (Belgrade), July–August, 1968, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Yugoslav News Bulletin*, July 22, 1968, pp. 1–2.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup> *The New York Times*, August 10, 1968.

<sup>14</sup> *East Europe*, September, 1968, p. 43.

<sup>15</sup> *East Europe*, October, 1968, pp. 47–51.



## YUGOSLAV CONDEMNATION

The Yugoslav reaction to these momentous changes was characteristically decisive. The day after the invasion, the L.C.Y. (Communist League of Yugoslavia) Central Committee issued a resolution unequivocally condemning it and demanding immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops. All military leaves were cancelled and a partial mobilization began. Two days later, Tito and Nicolae Ceausescu, the leader of now-beleaguered Rumania, met to "exchange views" on "current international problems of mutual interest." Immediately following the invasion, and on a number of occasions in September and in the following weeks, Yugoslavia asserted the nation's ability and willingness to defend itself. These statements were reinforced by announcement of an 8.2 per cent increase in the 1969 military budget, by extension of draft obligations (including women in time of national emergency), and by reactivation of the civil defense and partisan command structure.

In mid-November, responding to Yugoslav initiative, United States President Lyndon Johnson dispatched Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach to Belgrade for high-level consultations. No formal commitments were made (or even offered) by either side, but the visit strongly reaffirmed an earlier declaration by President Johnson of United States concern for Yugoslav independence. By the end of October, the Yugoslavs had asserted their commitment to independence in the strongest possible terms. It will probably never be known whether or not the Soviets actually contemplated military action against Yugoslavia. What seems undeniable is that the Yugoslavs (unlike the Czechs and the Slovaks) would have fought back. Some insight into the Yugoslav psychology may be gained from the following remark by Tito at a press conference in November:<sup>16</sup>

I do not imply that I think Czechoslovakia made a mistake in not fighting. It did well, for it was

in a special position. That sort of resistance is extremely difficult for anyone who wants to gain some goals. . . . but in our country it could not be as it was in Czechoslovakia. Even though we might want to, we would not be able to compel the people to look on peacefully.

The essence of a crisis is its transience. As 1968 ended, a certain stabilization began to settle over the Czechoslovak issue. In mid-November, some 60 Communist parties convened in Budapest to discuss the Soviet proposal for a major world gathering of Communist parties. In return for endorsement of its conference proposal, the Soviet Union pledged to withdraw the bulk of its troops from Czechoslovakia, and by the end of November, it appeared to have done so.

The Yugoslavs, of course, did not attend the Budapest Conference, but appeared satisfied with its outcome. In the course of a relaxed and wide-ranging press conference on the 25th anniversary of the establishment of Communist Yugoslavia,<sup>17</sup> President Tito indicated that he expected no further pressure from the Soviet bloc—military or otherwise—and was in fact willing to take steps to improve relations with the U.S.S.R. and the other bloc members. He noted that the Middle East situation was at least as dangerous to Yugoslav security as the European situation, and that Yugoslavia would like to see *both* the United States *and* the Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean reduced.

We had thought the presence of the Soviet fleet would contribute to a solution [of the Middle East Crisis] and we felt it was positive. But we are now afraid that one day it might come to a conflict between them, because one never knows when the situation may explode. It would be better if neither fleet were there, that they did not concentrate there, but we must accept the facts as they stand.<sup>18</sup>

This same press conference revealed an-  
(Continued on page 243)

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<sup>16</sup> *Yugoslav News Bulletin*, November 15, 1968, p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> *Yugoslav News Bulletin*, December 6, 1968, pp. 11-12.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

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"Regardless of [its new] indoctrination campaign . . . it is doubtful that the regime can hope to secure the allegiance of the people. One obstacle involves the open subservience to the U.S.S.R. and another the official anticlerical policy of the government."

## Poland: Myth Versus Reality

BY RICHARD F. STAAR

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IN HIS PRINCIPAL report to the fifth congress of the Polish United Workers' party (P.Z.P.R.—*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*), which met at Warsaw during November 11–16, 1968, Communist leader Wladyslaw Gomulka painted the picture of a stable and dynamic Poland which had made great strides in all spheres of activity.<sup>1</sup> He read the 80,000-word report with only two breaks for refreshments and lunch. Much of what the First Secretary told his audience of 1,759 delegates falls under the category of "socialist realism," i.e., making a projection into an optimistic future.

Thus, the main target of the 1971–1975 economic plan will be "an increase in the

living standard of the people" which today amounts to an average of only 2,059 zlotys per month in net earnings.<sup>2</sup> A good pair of shoes costs about ten days' wages. No specific objective was defined in this connection by Gomulka, but he did promise 350,000 cars per year at the end of the next five-year plan compared with 70,000 projected for 1969–1970. Most of these, of course, will be operated by the state. Although eight apartments per thousand inhabitants is the goal for 1975, admittedly "not all housing needs will have been met by then." However, the work week may be shortened during the next five-year plan, "conditioned by an appreciable streamlining in the organization of labor inside the enterprises and by the elimination of unwarranted overtime."

Gomulka followed these qualified promises<sup>3</sup> with a discussion of domestic events, allegedly involving a class struggle against right-wing socialist forces in cooperation with revisionist groups which are "attempting to sow ideological and political confusion." He then dealt with a specific example in the March, 1968, demonstrations sparked by the writers in Warsaw and subsequently enveloping the university students.<sup>4</sup> The wave of youth riots, according to Gomulka, was "dammed up by the working class."

The main allies of the reactionary forces, in this mythology, are the revisionists who want a socialist democracy based on that existing in West Europe. But, stated Go-

<sup>1</sup> *Radio Warsaw*, November 11, 1968. See the excellent analysis by Jerzy Ptakowski, "The Fifth Polish Party Congress," *East Europe*, January, 1969, pp. 3–8.

<sup>2</sup> The tourist rate of exchange is 24 zlotys to the dollar, but the black market rate is 130 to 1. See Nicholas Carroll in the London *Sunday Times*, reprinted by *The Washington Post*, November 28, 1968.

<sup>3</sup> During the first ten years of Gomulka's rule, i.e., through 1965, consumption of food per inhabitant declined by 4.4 per cent. See the article by Zygmunt Zekonski in *Przegląd zwiazkowy* (Trade Union Review), Warsaw, October, 1968. For a survey of this decade, see "The Hard Line in Poland," *Current History*, April, 1967, pp. 208–213, 244.

<sup>4</sup> A discussion about a group at the University of Warsaw, some 20 of whom were expelled from the youth movement and others sentenced to prison, appeared in *Prawo i zycie* (Law and Life), Warsaw, November 17, 1968.

Others, like Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, were being tried in early 1969. *Radio Warsaw*, January 3, 1969.

mulka, the P.Z.P.R. is implementing a genuine socialist democracy which is founded on (1) the authority wielded by the working class; (2) the socialization of the means of production; and (3) a planned economy.<sup>5</sup>

### THE WORLD-WIDE STRUGGLE

The domestic threat to genuine "democracy" allegedly remains closely related to the international situation. According to Gomulka's apocalyptic vision, the world is in the throes of an "intensifying struggle between the forces of socialism, progress and peace, and the forces of imperialism, reaction and war . . . on a global scale." Hence, the logical and general conclusion is that it has been possible to preserve peace in the world as well as in Europe thanks above all to the powerful missile and nuclear strength built up by the Soviet Union (which also sells wheat to Poland).<sup>6</sup>

Specifically, the Federal Republic of Germany was singled out by the Polish Communist leader as mainly responsible for the state of tension in Europe. Gomulka accused West Germany of attempting to change her borders, liquidate the (East) German Democratic Republic, and rebuild a militaristic greater *Reich* within her 1937 frontiers. According to Gomulka, Poland demands only that the

Federal Republic accept the status quo: (1) recognize existing borders, including the Oder-Neisse line and the frontier between the two Germanies; (2) acknowledge the existence of two German states, i.e., renounce claims to represent the whole German nation including West Berlin; and (3) cease alleged efforts to gain access to nuclear weapons. The West Germans, according to Gomulka, used their *Ostpolitik* to subvert Czechoslovakia. (Despite this kind of regime propaganda, added to regular secret police surveillance, Poles have expressed their sympathy for Czechoslovakia openly by bringing flowers to the Czechoslovak embassy in Warsaw.<sup>7</sup>)

If this West German *Ostpolitik* had been successful, the balance of power in Europe reportedly would have changed in favor of imperialism. Therefore, Gomulka contended, the entry of troops from the five Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia represented a "necessity dictated by our international duty and our national interests, the interests of peace and security." He also claimed that Yugoslavia<sup>8</sup> could maintain her policy of nonalignment only under the umbrella of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Gomulka called on all Communist parties to face the realities of the struggle between the two systems and to strive for victory on an international scale. He admitted that nobody could forecast when or how this historic victory of socialism over capitalism would come about on a world-wide basis. All methods could be used: the exploitation of parliaments and broad alliances with peace-loving forces, because "the roads to socialism not only can but must differ."

Finally, the P.Z.P.R.'s First Secretary discussed his party of just over two million, admitting that only 350,000 of the members had belonged to the movement for at least 20 years. On the other hand, about 1.2 million had joined the P.Z.P.R. after 1954, and 793,000 among the latter had been in the party for less than four years.<sup>9</sup> (See Table I for the P.Z.P.R.'s social composition.) The large turnover as well as the relatively new membership require supplementary teaching of Marxism-Leninism by a cadre of 75,000 lec-

<sup>5</sup> The P.Z.P.R. has rejected proposals for liberalization of the economy. The latter remains centralized, overburdened by bureaucracy, and infected with corruption. Carroll, *op. cit.* See also Bogdan Mieczkowski, "Poland: Politics vs. the Economy," *East Europe*, December, 1968, pp. 16-18.

<sup>6</sup> Trade with the U.S.S.R. will exceed two billion rubles in 1969, an increase of 18 per cent over the previous year. *Radio Moscow*, November 22, 1968. This new agreement includes 1.3 million tons of grain to be delivered during 1969 by the Soviet Union. Trade with the U.S.S.R. comprises 35 per cent of total Polish foreign trade.

<sup>7</sup> Observed by Gert Baumgarten and reported in the *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, September 3, 1968.

<sup>8</sup> *Radio Warsaw*, October 19, 1968, had already accused Yugoslavia of ideological and economic revisionism and questioned the goals of her foreign policy. The daily *Vjesnik* (Herald), Zagreb, November 16, 1968, in return attacked Gomulka for using the medical term "prophylaxis" as justification for invading Czechoslovakia. Only 12 years ago, this newspaper stated, "the world believed that this man [Gomulka] was a symbol. . . ."

<sup>9</sup> This detailed information was revealed prior to the fifth party congress in *Trybuna ludu* (People's Tribune), Warsaw, October 22, 1968.

**TABLE I: Population and P.Z.P.R. Social Composition  
(as of June 30, 1968)**

Category	Population		P.Z.P.R. Members	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Workers	13,849,010	43.0	812,000	40.0
Peasants	12,882,800	40.0	235,480	11.6
Intellectuals	2,898,630	9.0	874,930	43.1
Others	2,576,560	8.0	107,590	5.3
Totals	32,207,000	100.0	2,030,000	100.0

Sources: *Sztandar młodych* (Banner of Youth), Warsaw, September 6, 1968, for the total population and *Zołnierz wolności* (Soldier of Freedom), Warsaw, October 26, 1968, for social classes on a national basis; *Trybuna ludu*, November 11, 1968, for the P.Z.P.R. total and percentages; the remaining absolute figures were computed.

Notes: About 50.5 per cent of the total population lived in urban areas on the above date, and the P.Z.P.R. was organized into more than 70,000 primary party organizations throughout the country.

turers with a higher education. But even these instructors, according to Gomulka, do not always possess an adequately rooted knowledge of the "classics."

Gomulka admitted that more than 70 per cent of the apparatus, i.e., full-time paid party workers, have not completed any Communist P.Z.P.R. school. Even at the national level, in the Central Committee departments, only 45 per cent of the *aparatchiki* had completed such training. In order to remedy this condition, the Higher School of Social Sciences has been superseded by a Central Party School in Warsaw as well as by inter-province schools at centers in Katowice and Bydgoszcz.

Regardless of this indoctrination campaign, which extends also to the population at large (starting in the fall of 1968, all university students have been required to take a two-year course in Marxism-Leninism), it is doubtful that the regime can hope to secure the allegiance of the people. One obstacle involves its open subservience to the U.S.S.R.<sup>10</sup> and another the official anticleri-

cal policy of the government. Among the 32.2 million population, fewer than 400,000 or about 1.2 per cent belong to national minorities; the overwhelming majority is Roman Catholic—the traditional religion in Poland. Perhaps the rulers may have recognized this, because they permitted Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński to visit Rome during November 6–December 9, 1968, after a three-year ban on his travel abroad. He had angered the Communists in the fall of 1965 by responding to a letter from West German bishops with one that offered conciliation and forgiveness.

The government's permission for the Cardinal-Primate to leave Poland in 1968 was more interesting because on September 12 he had replied to a memorandum from the *Bensberger Kreis* of Roman Catholic intellectuals in West Germany.<sup>11</sup> The memorandum called for recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and had 149 signatures, including those of 30 university professors. In the name of the Polish episcopate, Cardinal Wyszyński thanked the *Bensberger Kreis* for its courage, goodwill and far-sightedness. The official Communist press criticized the memorandum for its alleged inconsistency, the advocacy of half-measures, as well as the reference to the injustice done German expellees.

Another problem faced by the Gomulka regime involves the Polish youth which appears to be alienated from the Communist government. Toward the end of January, 1968, students began demonstrations in Warsaw after the ban on further performances of

<sup>10</sup> A good illustration occurred when Marshal Marian Spychalski accepted the Order of Lenin from the U.S.S.R. on Polish Armed Forces Day. The same man had been a symbol of independence just 12 years before. *Christ und Welt* (Stuttgart), October 18, 1968. Jerzy Bordziliowski, a Red Army officer "on loan" to Poland (1944–1968) where he rose to deputy defense minister, retired in February and left for the U.S.S.R., only to return in a Soviet uniform with a military delegation in October. See *Politika* (Belgrade), December 2, 1968.

<sup>11</sup> This reply was mentioned by *Trybuna ludu*, October 2, 1968.



the play *Dziady* (Forefathers' Eve) by the nineteenth century Polish romantic poet, Adam Mickiewicz. The script included some anti-czarist Russian lines. Fifty students were arrested. After an interval of several weeks, demonstrations resumed.

In Warsaw alone, some 4,000 students clashed with about 500 policemen. Riots spread to other major cities like Krakow, Poznan, Wroclaw and Lodz.<sup>12</sup> Speaking later to party activists, Gomulka revealed that handbills had been distributed with slogans such as the following: Fight the PZPR! Seize weapons! Down with communism! Throw off the Moscow yoke! Down with the U.S.S.R.! Down with the Gomulka regime!

### ANTI-SEMITISM

Gomulka next asserted that a segment among the university youth of Jewish nationality or extraction participated actively in the riots and that the previous summer a certain number of Jews had wanted to leave Poland and fight on the side of Israel against the Arabs. He took a decisive stand against anti-Semitism but asserted that the P.Z.P.R. "fights Zionism as a political program." This distinction, even if honestly made, did not

prevent a sweeping purge of Jews<sup>13</sup> from official government and party positions.

Those initially removed included the fathers of student demonstrators, under the Communist principle of collective responsibility. About 8,300 P.Z.P.R. members were expelled from the party, most of them during this six-week purge. How many happened to be Jewish is unknown. About 5,000 Jews applied for and received Israeli entry visas, but probably fewer than 1,000 (or 20 per cent of this number) left Poland during 1967. Those departing in 1968 possibly totaled 3,500 person.<sup>14</sup> More than a dozen professors were dismissed for allegedly "poisoning" the minds of university students. Under a new policy, giving preference to children of worker and peasant background and discriminating against those from the intelligentsia, representatives of Communist youth organizations now sit on admissions boards. Half of those admitted to first-year university studies in the fall of 1968 received preferential treatment.<sup>15</sup>

While the purge was taking place on the domestic front, Gomulka was deeply involved in the Soviet-directed action against Czechoslovakia. He hosted the meeting during July, 1968, which resulted in the infamous Warsaw Letter signed by representatives of the U.S.S.R., Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. The official Polish press and radio supported bloc pressure against the Prague government without any deviation. When the Soviet leaders suddenly decided on a seeming reconciliation, Gomulka dutifully appeared at Bratislava on August 3 to sign the joint communiqué.<sup>16</sup>

Only 17 days later, some 45,000 Polish troops joined the other four cosignatories to the Warsaw Letter and crossed their borders to "provide the brotherly Czechoslovak nation [with] indispensable help," allegedly because "counter-revolutionary forces threatened the vital interests of Poland."<sup>17</sup> This official statement also contended that the invasion was based on international law, specifically the right to individual and collective self-defense. Popular opinion, however, was probably reflected in the letter from one of

<sup>12</sup> Reported in *The New York Times*, March 9, 1968, and March 14, 1968.

<sup>13</sup> Quotations from Gomulka's speech appeared in *Trybuna ludu*, March 20, 1968. Lucjan Blit, *The Anti-Jewish Campaign in Present-Day Poland* (London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, November, 1968), pp. 70-79, lists the names and positions of 152 persons, mostly Jews, who were purged.

<sup>14</sup> *The Washington Post*, April 21, 1968, quoting from *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw Life), for purge figures; *The New York Times*, December 30, 1968, on the 1968 emigration estimate. Between 80,000 and 100,000 Jews are estimated to have been hidden by Poles who risked their lives doing so under the Nazi occupation in World War II, according to Szymon Datner, *Las sprawiedliwych* (Forest of the Just) (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1963), cited by *Prawo i zycie*, December 15, 1968.

<sup>15</sup> *Trybuna ludu*, August 27, 1968.

<sup>16</sup> Russian texts of the July letter and August communiqué appeared in *Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star), Moscow, July 18, 1968, and August 4, 1968.

<sup>17</sup> "Declaration by the Government of the Polish People's Republic," broadcast over *Radio Warsaw*, August 21, 1968. Polish troops included the Sudeten Brigade and the 6th Pomeranian airborne division, both elite units, as well as two motorized infantry divisions and one Mig-15 aircraft division. See the article by Joachim Georg Görlich in *Das Wort* (Hildesheim), November 10, 1968.

Poland's best-known contemporary authors, Jerzy Andrzejewski, who wrote to the chairman of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union condemning the invasion and voicing support for the people of Czechoslovakia.<sup>18</sup>

Gomulka, the hard-liner, must have been gratified by the invasion and the subsequent agreement by the leadership in Prague to station U.S.S.R. troops "temporarily" along the frontier between Bohemia and the Federal Republic of Germany. (Soviet divisions have remained on Polish territory near Legnica in Silesia since 1945.) He specifically warned that it would be a long time before Czechoslovakia could recover from "counter-revolutionary and anti-socialist damage." Gomulka contended that such forces had "managed to loosen the bonds linking Czechoslovakia with the other Warsaw Pact states."<sup>19</sup>

### U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS

Even before the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the United States had come under attack in the theses published before the fifth P.Z.P.R. congress. After a standard denunciation of American "imperialism," this official party document warned that

Revisionism has become the main ally in the strategy of the imperialists [i.e., the United

States] and the forces of reaction. Revisionism uses opportunistic slogans of freedom under the pretext of democratization. This is objectively directed toward the resurrection of a liberal-bourgeois free play of political forces, toward opening a way for anti-socialist forces. Revisionism wants to extend the principle of peaceful coexistence with bourgeois [i.e., middle class] ideology.<sup>20</sup>

One aspect of relations between the United States and Poland has involved cultural exchange, including the possibility of "contamination" by means of bourgeois American ideology. For the time being at least, part of this danger has been eliminated with the cancellation by the United States State Department of programs in the performing arts, which were scheduled for October, 1968.<sup>21</sup> Participation by Polish armed forces in the attack on Czechoslovakia appeared to have precipitated this action. Other aspects of Polish-American exchanges are still in effect, although their future remains uncertain.

This future in the long run depends upon the succession to Gomulka. Some of the preparations for the P.Z.P.R. congress during the spring, summer and fall of 1968 involved a struggle for power waged by the supporters of Ryszard Strzelecki and Mieczyslaw Moczar.<sup>22</sup> Perhaps as a defense against this so-called partisan faction, Gomulka increased the number of Central Committee members from the provinces to 44 (from 19) and cut back representation from the central party apparatus to 27 (from 35) *aparatchiki*.<sup>23</sup> The purge affected 31 persons, including a few former socialists and liberals as well as individuals accused of coresponsibility for "misleading" university students in March, 1968. Fourteen persons were promoted from candidate to full membership, making a total of 40 newcomers in the 91-man Central Committee, which had been increased by six seats.

The new power elite in Poland (see Table II) includes 18 persons. Those dropped from this category at the fifth P.Z.P.R. congress were Adam Rapacki,<sup>24</sup> former socialist and Foreign Minister known for his proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe; Eugeniusz Szyr, the last Jew on the Politburo, who had supervised the economy

<sup>18</sup> Published in full by *Le Monde* (Paris), September 26, 1968, and by *Kultura* (Culture), Warsaw, October 13, 1968; excerpts in *East Europe*, November, 1968, p. 59.

<sup>19</sup> Speech broadcast over *Radio Warsaw*, September 8, 1968.

<sup>20</sup> The theses were published in full as a supplement to *Trybuna ludu*, July 13, 1968.

<sup>21</sup> See *The New York Times*, September 7, 1968. Another aspect of these relations involves United States loans made to Poland, a \$50-million repayment being due in 1969. *Ibid.*, January 13, 1969.

<sup>22</sup> Moczar has been reported by an acquaintance to be of Ukrainian extraction, and his real name is allegedly Nikolaj Diomko. Article by Roman Gro-nowski in *Tygodnik polski* (Polish Weekly), Melbourne, July 13, 1968.

<sup>23</sup> Names of new Central Committee members were broadcast over *Radio Warsaw*, November 16, 1968. See also Carroll, *op. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> Rapacki allegedly sent a letter to the Central Committee in which he condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He is also reported to have opposed the purge of his ministry which saw a 40 per cent turnover in top and middle-grade positions. *The New York Times*, October 31, 1968. Rapacki subsequently lost his post as foreign minister. *Ibid.*, December 21, 1968.

TABLE II: The Power Elite in Poland, 1969

<i>Politburo members</i> (12)	<i>Born</i>	<i>Office or responsibility</i>	<i>Date first elected</i>
Cyrankiewicz, Jozef	1911	Prime Minister	December 1948–
Gierek, Edward	1913	1st Secr., Katowice Province	(1956); March 1959–
*Gomulka, Wladyslaw	1905	First Secretary P.Z.P.R.	(1943–48); October 1956–
*Jaszczuk, Boleslaw	1913	economy	July 1968–
Jedrychowski, Stefan	1910	Foreign Minister	December 1956–
*Kliszko, Zenon	1908	Second Secretary (unofficial)	March 1959–
Kociolek, Stanislaw	1933	1st Secr., Gdansk Province	November 1968–
Kruczek, Wladyslaw	1910	1st Secr., Rzeszow Province	November 1968–
Loga-Sowinski, Ignacy	1914	Chairman, Trade Unions	October 1956–
Spychalski, Marian	1906	Chairman, Council of State	(1945–48); March 1959–
*Strzelecki, Ryszard	1907	party cadres	June 1964–
*Tejchma, Jozef	1927	agriculture	November 1968–
<i>Politburo candidates</i> (4)			
Jagielski, Mieczyslaw	1924	Agriculture Minister	March 1959–
Jaroszewicz, Piotr	1909	Deputy Prime Minister (C.M.E.A.†)	June 1964–
*Moczar, Mieczyslaw	1913	security and armed forces	July 1968–
*Szydla, Jan	1925	ideology	November 1968–

*Secretaries* (9—with seven marked by asterisk above)

*Olszowski, Stefan	1931	press and publications.	November 1968–
*Starewicz, Artur	1917	propaganda and agitation	July 1963–

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Directory of Polish Officials* (Washington, D.C.: August, 1967), pp. 102–110; *Radio Warsaw*, November 16, 1968; and current identifications from the press in Poland.

† Note: C.M.E.A.—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

as a Deputy Premier; and Franciszek Waniołka, another Deputy Premier, who had dealt with heavy industry.

The last two may have become scapegoats for Poland's basic failure to export enough to pay for imported technology. Witold Jarosinski's dismissal from the post of national P.Z.P.R. Secretary in charge of ideology and education most probably can be attributed to the student riots.

The newcomers have brought the average age on the Politburo from 56 down to 53. They include Jozef Tejchma, who remains on the Secretariat in charge of agriculture (which is 85 per cent private and saves the rural economy from complete bankruptcy) but has been made a full member of the Politburo; two province secretaries, Stanislaw Kociolek and Wladyslaw Kruczek, both of whom are known for their toughness and neo-stalinism; another man in this same category, Jan Szydla, now a candidate Politburo member; and the director of the Central Committee's press department, Stefan Olszowski, now a national P.Z.P.R. Secretary.

This has led to a tripartite division, with

the Gomulkaitees still retaining about half of the seats on the Central Committee—the other half being divided among the younger politicians and the economists (30 per cent) and the partisans (20 per cent). This last faction, which controls the police, security matters and party cadres, also has obtained positions of responsibility and influence within the armed forces. If it continues to make gains in the Politburo and in the Secretariat, the future may be in the hands of the Strzelecki and Moczar types, even before Gomulka leaves the scene. Should this occur, Poland will have a regime more rigorous than that of East Germany.

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*"When one considers the impressive display of German military prowess during two world wars in our century, it is not without grim interest that some Germans will obey orders as punctiliously when it comes to shooting at compatriots as when the targets are Frenchmen, Englishmen, Russians or Americans."*

## Two Germanies: A Nation without a State

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GERMANY BELONGS to a category of states that considered themselves world powers 50 years ago. Today they occupy a humbler place in the international order. They must now continuously attempt to maintain the conviction in Moscow and Washington that their survival is essential to the interest of the "superpowers." This is a challenging task. Within a narrower context, a resurrected Poland faced the challenge with respect to Germany and the Soviet Union between 1919 and 1939. By antagonizing both powerful neighbors, Poland failed and was partitioned. Today, the prospect in the event of similar failure is not division but total annihilation.

Within this dismal framework, Germany's situation has other peculiarities. Each of the other members of the second tier of powers has a single government. They either achieved unity centuries ago as a result of an ethnic or cultural consciousness or, more recently, as a result of the common struggle by racially and ethnically diverse tribes against an alien conqueror. Federated or united, all of them except Germany are national states.

Germany remains a nation without a state. Recently, the nature and scope of this condition was thrown into sharp relief by a modest attempt to revise the spelling rules of the German tongue. Education officials of the state of Rhineland-Palatinate in the Federal Republic have for years sought to abolish the

practice of capitalizing all nouns and have advocated the adoption of the simpler and more prevalent method which confines capitalization to the first word in a sentence and to proper names. Theirs has been a formidable undertaking because the Bonn constitution assigns exclusive control over educational matters to the states. Thus even so simple a matter as spelling must receive the legislative sanction of ten state parliaments.

After these hurdles have been negotiated, however, there remains a far more serious challenge: German is also the official language of the German Democratic Republic, the Republic of Austria, a large part of Switzerland, and the Principality of Liechtenstein. Any language reform adopted by only one German government promotes the disintegration of the cultural and ethnic unity from which the aspiration of political unity was first derived.

Capitalization of words is a small matter by itself. Now it could become the beginning of a widening cultural separation which could advance into every conceivable sector of everyday life. As long as the government in East Berlin can be expected to reject anything simply because it originated west of the line of demarcation, educators in the Federal Republic are understandably reluctant to promote in effect the cultural disintegration of Germanism. At least that is how the majority of them view this simple and sensible attempt at spelling modernization. At the same



time, this minor dilemma brings them face to face again with the multiple paralyzing results of their inability to give concrete form to national consciousness.

It may be argued, of course, that our acceptance of the nation state as the "normal" manifestation of statehood blinds us to the fact that political and language boundaries frequently vary. Europe, the cradle of nation states, has many bilingual or multilingual polities. Belgium, Yugoslavia and Switzerland are the most obvious. Languages associated with a particular nation are not necessarily confined to the state which that nation inhabits.

German is spoken on both sides of the border between the successor states to Bismarck's Germany, between the Federal Republic and Austria, and on the borders between Germany, Austria and Switzerland. It prevails also on both sides of the national fences separating Germany from Luxemburg (most of whose inhabitants are at least as German as the German Swiss) and, interestingly enough, on the two banks of the Rhine where it divides Germany from France (Alsace-Lorraine), and in the southern highlands where the Austro-Italian border cuts across the Alps.

French is spoken in Belgium and Switzerland as well as in France; Italian is spoken in France (in Nice and Corsica) and in Switzerland (in Ticino). Basques inhabit both sides of the mountain-divide between Spain and France, and Dutch is heard as frequently in the streets of the Netherlands' great Belgian competitor to the South, Antwerp, as it is in the Europort of Rotterdam.

### THE SEARCH FOR UNITY

Europe's division into nation states, in other words, is anything but neat. But the problems stemming from these divergencies are of varying magnitude. The existence of French and Italian ethnic fragments outside their large respective national communities does not create the agony of a divided nation. French, Italian and German Swiss have managed to find their own trilingual sense of unity. In the case of Germany the results vary. No German government has claimed the Swiss

since 1648. The Austrians were accepted as a separate people before they ceased to be part of the large multinational empire of the Habsburgs. What the Germans north of the Alps began to strive against in the nineteenth century was the absence of *any* focus of national life. Part of the German national aspiration then was to create—and is today to maintain—a center of cultural and political loyalty in Germany equal in significance to London for the English or Paris for the French. Between 1870 and 1930, Berlin was slowly becoming such a center, though certainly more slowly than observers often realized.

The creation of a national cultural center for all Germans between the Alps and the North and Baltic Seas was also expected to put an end to *violent* division. To the English and the French, for instance, war within the nation was civil war, intermittent tragedy, a manifestation of disorder. It came and it went, relived by future generations as history, with concern but ultimately with pride because it had been overcome.

In German history, order and unity have not been one and the same. In the seventeenth century there was much religious warfare. Religious war in Germany meant combat between Protestant and Catholic princes and their mercenary armies. Whereas religious wars in England and France were civil and relatively isolated conflicts, religious war in Germany was international and ultimately European in scope. Its outcome was not national reconciliation but long-term political division.

One hundred years after the religious issue had been settled, Germans owing allegiance to the King of Prussia marched against German allies and subjects of the Habsburg emperors in the Wars of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Years War (1756–1763). Then Germans fought against Napoleon and Germans fought with Napoleon until 1814. A Westphalian garrison defended Kuestrin on the Oder for the Emperor until March, 1814, three months after allied armies had crossed the Rhine several hundred miles to the West and ten days before these same allied armies entered Paris. At the same time,

all Englishmen had fought Napoleon, as had all Spaniards and all arms-bearing Russians. All Frenchmen, apart from a handful of royalist emigres, had risked their lives for their Emperor. Only Germans had shed their blood (as bravely to be sure) on both sides.

And then came the year 1866, when Prussia withdrew from the German Confederation and declared war on Austria. Nine other German states, including Bavaria in the south and Hanover in the north, took Austria's part. On June 27, the Hanoverians challenged a Prussian contingent and fought it to a standstill at Langensalza. When the guns fell silent that evening 2,500 Prussians and Hanoverians—Germans all—lay dead and wounded. A week later one of the greatest battles of the nineteenth century was fought near Koeniggratz in Bohemia. Once again German was pitted against German. Not only Austrians, but the entire army corps of the King of Saxony, stubbornly resisted until superior Prussian skill finally drove them in wild disorder across the Danube. Tens of thousands of Germans died at each others' hands that day. After Koeniggratz, Prussians moved into South Germany to battle Bavarians and Wuertembergers to final victory.

Out of this campaign and out of this Prussian victory came the German Empire, and also the memory of how well Germans make war regardless of their adversary. When one considers the impressive display of German military prowess during two world wars in our century, it is not without grim interest that some Germans will obey orders as punctiliously when it comes to shooting at compatriots as when the targets are Frenchmen, Englishmen, Russians or Americans.

These memories constitute much of the burden of German history. It has been easy to divide Germans; it has been difficult to preserve unity without strong pressure from above. The year 1945 has added another dimension to that tradition. Bismarck's Germany is now not only divided, but both halves are members of separate, mutually hostile power blocs. Their inhabitants owe allegiance to governments that do not recognize each other. In fact, they are committed to each

other's destruction. The situation resembles 1866, only worse. Today, unification by force of arms is out of the question. Unlike Austria and Prussia, neither the German Federal Republic nor the German Democratic Republic can pursue an independent policy of national reunification. Therefore neither can expect to engage the other in an isolated conflict while the world watches.

### THE FUNCTIONS OF DIVISION

Each Germany has become a bridgehead in a *cordon sanitaire* with which the United States and the Soviet Union seek to contain one another along the European front. This is at least one major function of the German division. Beyond this, the ideological differences between the German governments are relatively secondary.

But German division has other functions as well. At the time it began, in 1945, it was by no means clear that Washington and Moscow each needed a German bastion. The various allied zones of occupation were considered temporary expedients pending a settlement which would prevent the revival of German world power. The division became permanent, not as planned, but still in a manner which effectively reduced Germany from a power to a problem.

Considering this second function of the German status quo brings us to another historical event. Five years after the battle of Koeniggratz the German Empire was born. Fifty million German-speaking Europeans then had a government of their own. As has been repeatedly indicated, this constituted a larger degree of unification than achieved before, but it also continued to exclude unusually large ethnic fragments, the largest of whom were the ten million Austrians. Bismarck was satisfied to leave them where they were for two reasons: to begin with, he wanted to preserve the Habsburg Empire as an ally, to check Russia and to preserve a status quo in the Balkans that would neither threaten nor involve Germany. But there was another good reason for restraint. From the 1770's on there runs through the speculative thinking of German patriots a fear that

there are simply too many Germans to make complete union practical. A state embracing all German-speaking groups was and would be a threat by its very size.

In Europe, the two world wars have exalted this hypothesis into an axiom. By dint of numbers, industry, wealth, educational and industrial capacity, the Germans seem dangerous. After 1870 they could hope to survive unchallenged only by constantly emphasizing in word and deed their satisfaction with the status quo. Above all, no German government was to arouse the suspicion of entertaining territorial ambitions. No German government was to boast of its strength. In fact, Germans were constantly to pretend to be weaker than they actually were. Bismarck's policy generally followed these precepts.

There were lapses, to be sure. There was a much applauded speech that "we Germans only fear God, but otherwise nothing in this world." And there was the modest beginning of a colonial empire in Africa. But by and large, Germany adjusted well to the world around her and the world was at peace with Germany. William II and Adolph Hitler, however—each in his own way—managed to keep mankind in a constant state of agitation over Germany's desire to translate a tremendous potential of military and economic power into a position of international eminence.

By 1914, as a result of the behavior of the Kaiser and of too many of the men close to him, a new specter had come to haunt Europe: the specter of *furor teutonicus*. German behavior in the final crisis did little to banish it.<sup>1</sup>

By 1939, after the German annexation of Austria, after the occupation of the Sudetenland and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, the specter had been resurrected, and German behavior in that crisis gave it ineradicable substance.

Twice Germany has convinced her neighbors that she was indeed stronger than each of them, as well as all of them put together, and twice she has paid the price. Twice Ger-

many has recovered quickly and spectacularly from catastrophe. The second time, the division of Germany has in fact wrought a two-fold miracle of economic resurrection. West Germany has been the second industrial exporter in the world for almost a decade now and, since 1965, the hourly production rate of German labor has once again increased 25 per cent. East Germany is a clear second in the economic power scale of the Soviet bloc and stands first in many significant areas of industrial production, although her territory is far smaller than that of the other satellites (except Hungary), and such allies as Poland and Rumania have considerably larger populations. The two fragments have had to work harder to survive and therefore they have accomplished more in recovery.

If the economic achievements of the two Germanies are added to the memories of the century since Koeniggratz, unification becomes even more unlikely. The Soviet bloc needs the German Democratic Republic. (This provides one explanation of its sensitivity to the Czech reform movement. The D.D.R. must not be outflanked by a protestant reform communism.) The West also needs the Federal Republic. West Germany exports one-fifth of her industrial output, including 44 per cent of the tonnage produced in her shipyards, 40 per cent of her automotive production, and 38 per cent of her heavy machinery. What if this reservoir of strength were withdrawn from the open world markets and placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union? The United States could not possibly countenance the resulting shift in the world balance of power.

## RISKS OF REUNIFICATION

To put these two formidable if unequal halves together again embraces equally prohibitive risks for all sides. Times may have changed. Nuclear weaponry may have ruled out Bismarckian, Wilhelmian or Hitlerian power politics. But memories do not change as fast as technology. No European state would welcome a united Germany for a neighbor. It is true that the German who was 21 in 1933 is 57 today, and that the men who

<sup>1</sup> Joachim Remak, *The Origins of World War I* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 137.

lifted Hitler into the saddle are dead or senile. But who has confidence in their sturdy children? And who is to say that Europe's memories should be less tenacious when Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauss refers to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as "a new Versailles of cosmic proportions" and threatens to lead his Christian Social Union (the Bavarian wing of the Christian Democratic Union) out of the current government coalition if his government signs this agreement?<sup>2</sup> What does the Federal Republic (or Europe, as Strauss prefers to put it) want with atomic weapons, unless it expects to use them aggressively? Given the size of the territory, German retaliation after a nuclear attack is impossible. Germany can use nuclear weapons only to prevent a first strike by an adversary. In a word, if Strauss is serious, then his proposition is serious indeed and will only confirm the worst suspicions of Germany's numerous, incurably suspicious neighbors.

No one should exploit this possibly fleeting contretemps in German domestic affairs, either to make of Strauss another Hitler, or to provide the sole argument against German unity. Bringing the two halves of Germany together is impossible. The frustrations and setbacks of the past have made German division a particularly heavy psychological burden. Disunity has been bloody and humiliating.

Unity, on the other hand, has been historically equally difficult to maintain, and many segments of ethnic Germany have ceased to be interested in joining a German polity. The Swiss lost interest centuries ago. The Luxemburgers severed their political connections in 1866 and their economic ties in 1918, and have not regretted it. The Austrians as of now seem determined to speak German and think Austrian. The Alsatians do not conceal their German cultural heritage, nor their allegiance to France. The rest of Germandom is caught between two power blocs, rather than two ideologies, and cannot hope to extri-

cate itself either by its own effort or with the help of others.

To make this dichotomy between cultural unity and political diversity acceptable one must become reconciled to the underlying dual view of Germany. As far back as 1851, publicist Constantin Frantz provided a convincing text in his essay "On German Federation." He concluded that there was no objective need for every nation to form a state or to give its undivided allegiance to a single government. The state, he argued, had been an invention of the Romans. Germany never had been a state. She consisted of too many diverse elements, each of which demanded a separate political existence. Frantz, of course, thought of Austria and Switzerland. He was mindful of the jealousies that would be aroused if these two countries were to be joined with what was then confederated Germany. His maxims should be applied to the D.D.R. and the Federal Republic as well.

But there is life in Bismarck's ghost. German unity is not solely the aspiration of the Bonn government. East German leader Walter Ulbricht is no less a German, and he has paid rueful tribute to his Prussian predecessor by translating Bismarck's recipe for victory to suit the conditions of the 1960's. According to Ulbricht, Bismarck understood "that Germany can only exist if it cultivates peaceful relations in East and West" from which he deduced "that the national reunification of Germany . . . is only possible if there exist good relations with the Soviet Union and the other European countries, particularly France."<sup>3</sup> At face value, this is reasonable.

But in the final analysis we have already shown why Ulbricht's neo-Bismarckian policy guidelines cannot generate more than a feeble hope. They cannot assure unity. Both German governments must strive to make as many friends as possible. Both governments have accordingly sought to cross bloc lines. Ulbricht's statement illustrates his interest in a foothold in Paris. West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt has actively (and with limited success) wooed members of the Soviet

<sup>2</sup> *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), January 6, 1969.

<sup>3</sup> *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), October 3, 1965.



bloc. But the issues here are trade treaties, diplomatic recognition and the intangibles of goodwill. No diplomatic partner of either Germany has offered to become more than a verbal partisan of reunification, and many have recoiled even from that platonic gesture.

If the situation resembles 1866, only worse, then reading Bismarck cannot lead to the discovery of any cures. Germany will remain divided, and her fate will respond to the needs of both blocs.

Ulbricht can ride out the difficulty more easily. His government is not visibly responsive to public opinion. The goals of his state are to be found in the areas of social reform and reorganization, and its political aims are secondary, since the foreign policy of East Berlin is entirely manufactured in the Soviet Union. The Bonn government has more leeway in the shaping of its foreign relations and therefore assumes before its own constituency a greater amount of responsibility for the German fate. On the issue of reunification, however, it is equally impotent. But that fact is only slowly dawning upon the citizens of the Federal Republic, and the illusion that reunification is a realistic goal dies hard.

### NATIONAL IDENTITY

Both Germanies must, in any case, begin to develop a national-political identity. The German Democratic Republic is about to accomplish this by advertising itself with some limited success as "the first German state of workers and peasants." Within its confines it has enacted certain social and economic reforms, notably in the countryside of Mecklenburg, which have not been without popular echo. Agrarian feudalism, nurtured under the empire and left largely inviolate by the Weimar Republic, has disappeared. What has replaced it is most likely a good deal less onerous.

The Federal Republic whose peasantry has for centuries been free must find other ways of developing "a proper sense of identity which will enable its citizens to feel themselves

truly a nation.<sup>4</sup> This effort must be made not to appease West Germany's partners in the European Economic Community, nor to serve the United States, nor to display servility toward any other specific cause or power. It must be made despite the fact that such a development—the construction of a new framework for national solidarity—undermines traditional values and thus leads through a critical interim during which every aspect of order is in jeopardy. (Bismarck took the same risks when he torpedoed the German Confederation.)

The old national consciousness is empty because the forms on which it rested cannot be restored; the new patriotism is untried and devoid of magnetism. The symptoms of attendant crisis are already all too evident. Student unrest, public concern over the growing number of resisters to military service, revival of organized political extremism of all kinds bear witness to the difficulty of the task at hand. And Bonn has no Red Army to suppress these symptoms of a painful metamorphosis. But the state founded in 1949 is the only means by which the inhabitants of the Federal Republic can preserve their freedom of political and cultural expression. A new generation must transform the experiment into a tradition.

Two Germanies, members of two competing alliances, will at the same time continue to speak the same language, cherish similar memories, sing the same songs, study the same classics and recite the same poems. Their kinship is as immutable as are the elements which make their separation inevitable. Therein lies their greatest and their only opportunity. They must initiate a dialogue. Whatever the future of their nation, it rests

(Continued on page 244)

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Hans A. Schmitt, a frequent contributor to *Current History*, is the author of *The Path of European Union: From the Marshall Plan to the Common Market* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962) and of *Charles Peguy: The Decline of an Idealist* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967).

<sup>4</sup> Waldemar Besson, "Where is Germany? The problem of national identity in the Federal Republic," *Modern World, Annual Review of International Relations*, V (1967), p. 119.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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**ELEMENTS OF CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE: PROSPECTS FOR FREEDOM.** EDITED BY DAVID S. COLLIER AND CURT GLASER. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1968. 341 pages and index, \$7.50.)

**THE COMMUNIST REGIMES IN EASTERN EUROPE: AN INTRODUCTION.** BY RICHARD F. STAAR. (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967. 354 pages and index, \$7.50.)

The first of the two works on East Europe is a compendium of papers presented at a conference held in West Germany in the fall of 1966. The participating scholars were men of stature from both sides of the Atlantic, but unfortunately they were not representative of a very wide spectrum of opinion on the provocative subject of the book. United States Senator Thomas J. Dodd provides the introductory essay. An indication of the book's tone and relevancy can be found in his statement: "Let there be no mistake about it: the overwhelming majority of the American people and the overwhelming majority of those Americans who have special knowledge of the problem support the Administration's [Vietnam] policy to the hilt."

Professor Staar's book is an effort to introduce the "beginning student" to the complexities of East Europe. Abandoning the functional approach of several excellent recent studies of East Europe which cut across national boundaries to compare common and dissimilar elements of the political structures of the East European nations, the author provides instead a set of brief essays, each dealing with a particular nation. Three concluding chapters on military, economic and political integration counterbalance to some extent the

earlier compartmentalization of the book. There is a good general (but unannotated) bibliography.

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Windham College

**FROM PRAGUE AFTER MUNICH.** BY GEORGE F. KENNAN. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968. 253 pages and index, \$6.50.)

Those watching anxiously to see what will become of Czechoslovakia—politically and spiritually—in the train of Soviet occupation, will find little solace in this fascinating collection of hitherto unpublished diplomatic and personal papers penned by the author while serving as Secretary of the United States Legation in Prague during the year following the Munich Agreement of 1938. The papers record vividly the collapse of Czechoslovakia and her occupation and dismemberment by Nazi Germany, providing sobering insight into the psychology of a small nation which must somehow adjust to the fact of domination by a neighboring great power.

S.A.

**BEYOND VIETNAM: THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA.** BY EDWIN O. REISCHAUER. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, 242 pages, \$4.95.)

A distinguished American student of Japan and President John F. Kennedy's ambassador to that nation, Edwin O. Reischauer is well qualified to comment on the shortcomings of our Asian policy, and to suggest necessary changes. His thesis is that United States involvement in the past has too often tried to impose solutions on Asia, as in Vietnam, rather than to seek ways to help Asians find their own

solutions to their problems. Beyond this lies a deeper criticism: Americans, both inside and outside the government, do not really understand Asia. Reischauer's book is an effort to inform the lay reader about the Asian complexity, and to suggest ways in which our policy could be brought more nearly into accord with it.

S.A.

#### THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION IN SOVIET MILITARY AFFAIRS.

TRANSLATED AND EDITED, WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY, BY WILLIAM R. KINTNER AND HARRIET FAST SCOTT. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968. 420 pages, glossary and index, \$6.95.)

On the assumption that Soviet thinking about military strategy and the changes which have been wrought in it by developments in the fields of nuclear weapons and rocketry are too important to be left to the military, the authors of this study offer solid fare for those interested in foreign policy and world affairs.

Translations of key Soviet articles on such themes as nuclear war, the adaptation of the Soviet armed forces to the missile age, and the outline of strategic-military projections for the 1970's form the core of the book. The Soviet writers are the leading authorities on military affairs and their introduction to Western audiences is felicitously arranged through the lucid translations of Harriet Fast Scott.

The editors' notes are excellent: informative, professional and soberly presented. A careful reading of this work must occasion some cautious second thoughts about the prospects for protracted peace with the Soviet Union: "The basic direction of Soviet military development appears to be a concentrated drive to achieve military-technical superiority." If this assessment is correct, the United States may have to take some hard looks at its underlying assumptions.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein  
University of Pennsylvania

RUSSIA'S PROTECTORATES IN CENTRAL ASIA: BUKHARA AND KHIVA, 1865-1924. BY SEYMOUR BECKER. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968. 416 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

Russian expansion into Central Asia is a complex and fascinating subject. In this scholarly study, Professor Becker has explored the fate of Bukhara and Khiva under the Czars. He examines "the motives and methods for the extension of Russian control over the khanates, the post-conquest policies followed by the imperial government toward its two protectorates, the reasons for those policies, difficulties they encountered, and the fate of Bukhara and Khiva at the hands of the revolutionary successors to the tsars." He vividly describes the leading protagonists against a setting of intrigue, ethnic animosities and economic modernization. An absorbing account of a bygone era, this study is also valuable for an understanding of the background of the present-day Soviet Central Asian republics.

A.Z.R.

HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS: OR THE REMEMBERED PAST. BY JOHN LUKACS. (New York: Harper and Row, 1968. 373 pages. Certain notes and index, \$7.95.)

We live in what is often euphemistically referred to as a "future-oriented" society, in which increasing numbers of influential individuals dismiss the past as irrelevant. Professor Lukacs has provided an eloquent rejoinder. He argues that the Western traditions of truth and of justice, the rocks on which our civilization rests, are rooted in a consciousness of our historical antecedents. For him, "Westernization" is a world objective, and only its realization in spirit as well as in skills can enable us to avoid the pitfalls of threatening chaos. Dismissing the fact-gatherers and computer-compilers for failing to appreciate "that the remembered past is a much larger

category than the recorded past," he examines the "growth of historical consciousness beyond the confines of professional historiography." The reader is taken on an excursion into the realms of philosophy, economics, social and political trends, literature and science, a trip that is intellectually exhilarating and exhausting.

This is an erudite work, written with grace and precision. The analysis is disciplined, thorough, and persuasive, and merits the attention of every serious student of modern man.

A.Z.R.

**COMMUNISM AND THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL QUESTION.** BY PAUL SHOUP. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. 308 pages, bibliography and index, \$9.50.)

Yugoslavia's future as a viable nation-state depends upon the ability of the post-Tito generation of leaders to reconcile nationality differences. As a multilingual, multinational, multireligious society, Yugoslavia faces staggering challenges. These have been analyzed with meticulous thoroughness and dispassionate perceptiveness by Professor Shoup.

There are excellent chapters on the origins of the principal nationality rivalries, the early position of the Yugoslav Communist party, and the position of the Communists under Tito during World War II. Special attention is devoted to the Macedonian question, which affects not only Yugoslav internal developments but Yugoslav relations with Bulgaria and Greece. The author traces the espousal of "Yugoslavism" to 1958, and the reversion to republic particularism that has characterized the more recent period. He gives full and accurate treatment to the economic dimensions of the problem, relating them to the struggle for power within the League of Yugoslav Communists. He concludes that the nationality problem, "notwithstanding its deep roots in Yugoslav history, is a symptom of the presently unsettled state

of Yugoslav society and politics." Anyone wanting to understand the complex problems faced by a Yugoslavia at a critical period in her evolution should give careful attention to this admirable work.

A.Z.R.

**CONTEMPORARY SOVIET GOVERNMENT.** BY L. G. CHURCHWARD. (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1968. 366 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$6.95.)

Instructors of courses in Soviet government will be grateful to Professor Churchward, Reader in Political Science at the University of Melbourne, for this excellent text. His focus is on the origins and operation of Soviet governmental institutions and practices: the Soviet state system, the electoral system, the role of the legislature, executive, and administrative agencies, as well as the oft-neglected local governments. The research is solid; the writing is lucid; and the interpretations are fair-minded. The author's treatment of the material is most welcome, coming at a time when preoccupation with crises and *avant garde*-type approaches has tended to overlook the eminent successes of the Soviet system of government.

A.Z.R.

**ALLIED INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA, 1917-1920.** BY JOHN BRADLEY. (New York: Basic Books, Publishers, 1968. 251 pages, bibliography and index of names, \$6.50.)

To the growing literature on the origins and long-term policy implications of the Allied intervention in Russia during the 1918-1921 period, one may happily add this contribution. In a tightly organized account, the author analyzes the complex factors underlying the policies of the different Western countries. He concludes that "Allied intervention policy proved a fiasco from which ultimately no one benefited, either politically or economically."

A.Z.R.



**SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY: FIFTY YEARS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE.** BY ROBERT WARING HERRICK. (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1968. 197 pages, bibliography and index, \$9.00.)

The intensified activity of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean since the Middle East war of 1967 and the occupation of Czechoslovakia have raised a discussion over the purpose, capability and strategic doctrine of the naval component of the Soviet military. Fortunately, an excellent study is now available. Robert Herrick, a former naval officer with extensive experience in Soviet affairs, has written a balanced and scholarly account of the Soviet Navy in historical perspective. One can agree with the author that "owing to the long-standing predominance of political and Army leaders in the formulation and execution of the USSR's unified military strategy and their general lack of understanding of sea power, the USSR has a basically defective naval strategy for *general war purposes*" (reviewer's italics). But one need not depreciate—as the author apparently does—the seriousness with which the U.S.S.R. is building up a naval force capable of neutralizing United States naval power in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf areas, and its import for the conduct of our foreign policy in the Middle East.

A.Z.R.

**THE GREAT TERROR.** BY ROBERT CONQUEST. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968. 633 pages and index, \$9.95.)

At the core of any understanding of the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin is the period marked by the terrible purges of the 1930's, when the remnants of the 1917–1920 Communist leadership were decimated, millions of innocent victims were capriciously condemned to death and the Soviet political system underwent a fundamental convulsion. Thanks to Nikita

Khrushchev—who was ironically a prime beneficiary of the purges—and his destalinization campaign, an enormous amount of information has come to light in recent years about the murky and tragic events of the 1934–1939 period.

Robert Conquest, a perceptive observer of Soviet developments, has drawn on Soviet sources, first-hand accounts and documentary material to provide a vivid account of show trials, fake confessions and the political climate.

A.Z.R.

**ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION.** EDITED BY ERICH GOLDHAGEN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 351 pages. \$8.75.)

This compendium of articles provides a useful overview of the evolution and contemporary condition of the main ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union. Written by noted specialists, the essays are informative and carefully researched; they acknowledge the advances which many ethnic groups have experienced under Soviet rule, but share the view that nationality consciousness has grown stronger in recent years, and may be expected to be a source of future difficulty for the Soviet leadership.

A.Z.R.

**UNITY IN DIVERSITY: ITALIAN COMMUNISM AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD.** BY DONALD L. M. BLACKMER. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1968. 434 pages, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

Publication of this study marks the end of a long and glaring absence of a major work on the Italian Communist party. Professor Blackmer has written a thorough account of the Italian Communist party (P.C.I.) and its relationship to the Communist world in the post-1953 period. The study is primarily concerned "with the increasing divergence between the interests

of the Italian and the Soviet parties as a case study in the gradual collapse of international Communist unity." At the same time, it identifies the persisting linkages between the P.C.I. and Moscow.

The author skillfully analyzes the changing character of the P.C.I. as a consequence of destalinization in the U.S.S.R., and of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The domestic and foreign policy aspects of P.C.I. policy are also developed.

A.Z.R.

**COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN THE U.S.S.R., 1917-1967.** BY T. H. RIGBY. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 573 pages, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

Specialists on Soviet politics will find this volume a valuable reference work. It is "concerned with the history of recruitment to the Soviet Communist party and the composition of the party during the first half-century of the Soviet regime." A lengthy introduction develops a sophisticated analytical and conceptual framework. Part I treats party membership and recruitment historically, against a setting of Soviet society in transformation and trauma; Part II discusses specialized subjects, including personnel turnover, nationality, education and social composition. Professor Rigby is to be congratulated on a major scholarly work, one that should quickly gain recognition as the standard work on the subject.

A.Z.R.

**SOVIET WORKS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA.** BY PETER BERTON AND ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN. (Los Angeles, Calif.: University of Southern California Press, 1968. 200 pages, \$4.50.)

The growing involvement of Soviet policy-makers in Southeast Asian affairs has had its counterpart in the interest of Soviet scholars and analysts concerned with this crucial area. This monograph traces the organization and activities of Soviet aca-

demic institutions concerned with Southeast Asia; it identifies and discusses the principal works produced by Russian scholars; and it offers guides to research. This is a comprehensive bibliography of the non-periodical Soviet literature for the 1946-1965 period.

S.R.

**THE FIRST BOLSHEVIK: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF PETER TKACHEV.** BY ALBERT L. WEEKS. (New York: New York University Press, 1968. 221 pages, appendix, index and chronological list of Tkachev's writings, \$7.50.)

Present-day Soviet historians treat Tkachev not as a forerunner of Bolshevism, but rather as a disruptive prophet of anarchy and conspiratorial adventures, a true disciple of Blanqui. Actually, according to Weeks, the Bolsheviks should be indebted to Tkachev as the first proponent of a tightly centralized elite party, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the withering away of the state, the factors favoring a socialist revolution in as unlikely a country as Russia, and a good many other ideas familiar to students of Lenin's thought.

The biographical narrative occupies only a small portion of this book, the rest of which is devoted to a systematic exposition of Tkachev's thought. The text is supported with lengthy citations, which are valuable because of the unavailability of much of Tkachev's writing in English. Point-by-point comparisons with the thinking of Marx and Lenin drive home the author's thesis.

Robert J. Osborn  
University of Pennsylvania

**SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOVIET RUSSIA.** BY ALEX INKELES. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968. 433 pages, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

The essays in this collection were written between the early 1950's and the present, and this very fact makes Alex Inkeles a member of a small elite which has been

willing to republish studies and predictions without apology for having predicted wrongly. The author's preeminence in the field of Soviet studies is due in part to his role as the main interpreter of the Harvard-sponsored survey of the lives and opinions of displaced persons from the Soviet Union; a number of items in the volume are based on this survey data.

The most durable of these articles are those dealing with Inkeles' two main specialties in the area: mass communications and social stratification. While the author justifies presenting rather old data (the memories of the displaced persons are from the 1920's, the 1930's and the war years) in terms of the relevance of the methodology he devised, their worth will more likely be judged in terms of the results. The questions which Inkeles was asking in the 1950's and early 1960's can still be asked today. Yet the questions, data and methodology for further research on Soviet society are bound to be determined more and more by the young and growing corps of Soviet sociologists. But since the emphasis of Soviet sociology for the near future is—to put the matter in a nutshell—bound to concentrate on work satisfactions of the present rather than political and social dissatisfactions of the past, the record presented here is of lasting interest as social history.

R.J.O.

**SOCIAL WELFARE IN THE SOVIET UNION.** BY BERNICE Q. MADISON. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968. 240 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$8.50.)

Social work as a separate profession is unknown in the Soviet Union, yet in fact a large proportion of the types of service rendered by social work agencies in the United States and elsewhere have Soviet equivalents. Here for the first time the Soviet programs are described in their full range. These include social security, services for the aged and disabled, family and

child welfare services, and—perhaps most interesting of all—collective and individual approaches to dealing with difficult and handicapped children.

Bernice Madison, a professor of social work at San Francisco State College, has confined her study largely to description. At the same time, she raises the question of what United States and Soviet social work agencies could learn from each other, and suggests some answers. The 75-page historical survey of Soviet welfare programs and practices is useful because these developments were largely neglected by foreign students of the Soviet system after the 1930's.

R.J.O.

**THE HISTORY OF GERMANY SINCE 1789.** BY GOLO MANN. Translated from the German by Marian Jackson. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 547 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

Written in the mid-1950's and revised and lengthened in the light of works published since that time, Golo Mann's compendious volume is one of the best on its subject. Hajo Holborn's treatment of a somewhat similar period is more detailed; W. M. Simon's coverage is more condensed. Mann seems to have achieved a happy medium. Over 500 closely printed pages covering nearly 200 years are not too much when—through a century of that time—European history revolved around the achievements and ambitions of the Germans.

The author traces the emergence of a German nation, its rise to world power, its crash into defeat bringing the ruins of all Europe down about its head and, finally, its divided renascence of the last quarter-century. He does this judiciously, devoting an appropriately large portion of his space to the years before 1918, taking account of the views of revisionists and counter-revisionists, dismissing (perhaps too readily) the suggestions of A. J. P. Taylor, rightly ignoring the follies of extremists. Mod-

erate but unafraid of commitment; thoughtful, intelligent and clear; this is first-class historical narrative with a strong political bent.

Eugen Weber

University of California, Los Angeles

FRANCE IN THE AGE OF THE SCIENTIFIC STATE. BY ROBERT GILPIN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 474 pages and index, \$12.50.)

Now and again a book appears that sheds new light on old questions and suggests new ones. Robert Gilpin has written such a book and written it well. His discussion of the relationship between science, state and society in France today helps us to reach a better understanding of the Fourth and Fifth Republics, and the problems facing all modern states caught in the toils of scientific revolution.

At a time when prosperity and power depend on technological innovation and this, in turn, on scientific research, the French fear that the "science gap" between France and the United States—the most advanced of scientific powers—is leading to dependence on the United States, a condition bound to get worse in the absence of radical remedies. French President Charles de Gaulle's policy choices reflect this fear and the determination to preserve French national personality and reverse the ominous trend by drawing on vast government investments. Gilpin examines the basis for French fears and policies and the likelihood that European backwardness in science and technology (a matter of mentality as much as scale) may lead to the "permanent economic subjugation and political domination of Europe by the United States." He concludes that the answer to a very real challenge can be found only on a European—not a national—level.

The importance of his study, however, lies less in its cautious conclusions than in the details which the author analyzes. Essential for students of contemporary France, this book should really be classed as required reading for all concerned with the

problems and the future of the modern world.

E.W.

WEST GERMANY. BY MICHAEL BALFOUR. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 300 pages, statistical appendix, reading suggestions, index, \$7.50.)

A nation-state called "Germany" came into being less than a century ago and, after the agonizing turning-point of defeat in the Second World War, "Germany" is today again divided. This volume in the "Nations of the Modern World" series tells the story of West Germany and is recommended to anyone interested in the present condition of this country situated in the crucial center-ground of Europe. Mr. Balfour presents a short historical perspective for postwar West Germany by using his first chapters to "track in" on his main subject like a film cameraman, selecting for exposition those features of German history most relevant to understanding the postwar scene. For example, since the great achievement of the Adenauer era was to give West Germany "seventeen years of prosperity and order in which democracy for the first time in the country's history became associated with success," Mr. Balfour takes care to explain why Germany's first attempt at democracy, the Weimar republic, failed, and why before and after Weimar, success was associated with non-democratic rule. But he is fully aware that for Germany the great divide was the cataclysmic defeat in war in 1945 and that the new states of Germany that developed in both East and West took off in a new direction.

Mr. Balfour begins his concentrated narrative with the problems of a German settlement as they developed during the war. He gives a full and perceptive account of the postwar years of crises, the increasingly strained relations between the occupying powers, the separation into Eastern and Western zones, the efforts to establish viable economic and political systems in the West,

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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# Pravda on the Invasion of Czechoslovakia

*On September 25, 1968, the Soviet Communist party newspaper Pravda published an article on the "Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries." Excerpts from the article, which justified the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia of August, 1968, are reprinted here:*

In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia, the question of the correlation and interdependence of the national interests of the socialist countries and their international duties acquire particular topical and acute importance.

The measures taken by the Soviet Union, jointly with other socialist countries, in defending the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people are of great significance for strengthening the socialist community, which is the main achievement of the international working class.

We cannot ignore the assertions, made in some places, that the actions of the five socialist countries run counter to the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the rights of nations to self-determination.

The groundlessness of such reasoning consists primarily in that it is based on an abstract, nonclass approach to the question of sovereignty and the rights of nations to self-determination.

The peoples of the socialist countries and Communist parties certainly do have and should have freedom for determining the ways of advance of their respective countries.

However, none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries, and the whole working class movement, which is working for socialism.

This means that each Communist party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets

this, in stressing only the independence of the Communist party, becomes one-sided. He deviates from his international duty.

Marxist dialectics are opposed to one-sidedness. They demand that each phenomenon be examined concretely, in general connection with other phenomena, with other processes.

Just as, in Lenin's words, a man living in a society cannot be free from the society, a particular socialist state, staying in a system of other states composing the socialist community, cannot be free from the common interests of that community.

The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement. Lenin demanded that all Communists fight against small-nation narrow-mindedness, seclusion and isolation, consider the whole and the general, subordinate the particular to the general interest.

The socialist states respect the democratic norms of international law. They have proved this more than once in practice, by coming out resolutely against the attempts of imperialism to violate the sovereignty and independence of nations.

It is from these same positions that they reject the leftist, adventurist conception of "exporting revolution," of "bringing happiness" to other peoples.

However, from a Marxist point of view, the norms of law, including the norms of mutual relations of the socialist countries, cannot be interpreted narrowly, formally, and in isolation from the general context of class

struggle in the modern world. The socialist countries resolutely come out against the exporting and importing of counterrevolution.

Each Communist party is free to apply the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and of socialism in its country, but it cannot depart from these principles (assuming, naturally, that it remains a Communist party).

Concretely, this means, first of all, that, in its activity, each Communist party cannot but take into account such a decisive fact of our time as the struggle between two opposing social systems—capitalism and socialism.

This is an objective struggle, a fact not depending on the will of the people, and stipulated by the world's being split into two opposite social systems. Lenin said: "Each man must choose between joining our side or the other side. Any attempt to avoid taking sides in this issue must end in fiasco."

It has got to be emphasized that when a socialist country seems to adopt a "non-affiliated" stand, it retains its national independence, in effect, precisely because of the might of the socialist community, and above all the Soviet Union as a central force, which also includes the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any of the links in the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, which cannot look indifferently upon this.

The antisocialist element in Czechoslovakia actually covered up the demand for so-called neutrality and Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the socialist community with talk about the right of nations to self-determination.

However, the implementation of such "self-determination," in other words, Czechoslovakia's detachment from the socialist com-

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## Soviet Communiqué on Czechoslovakia

*On October 5, 1968, the Soviet news agency Tass released the text of a communiqué on negotiations held October 3–4, 1968, between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia on their "developing relations" after the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. The complete text of the communiqué follows:*

Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations were held in Moscow on October 3–4, 1968.

Taking part in the negotiations from the Soviet side were L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union; A. N. Kosygin, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers; N. V. Podgorny, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and president of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.

From the Czechoslovak side: A. Dubcek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, O. Cernik, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Government and member of the Presidium of the

Central Committee of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, G. Husak, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Slovakia and member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia.

The sides studied questions of developing relations between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia. Special attention was given to the fulfillment of agreements and undertakings drafted by the delegations of the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia in Moscow from August 23 to 26 this year,<sup>1</sup> proceeding from the principles recorded in the final documents of the meeting in Cierna Nad Tisou and the conference in Bratislava. It was reiterated that these undertakings are the basis for achieving a normalization of socio-political life in Czechoslovakia, for developing Czechoslovakia's friendly relations with the Soviet

<sup>1</sup>For excerpts from the communiqué that followed this meeting, see *Current History*, November, 1968, p. 300.

Union and other countries of the socialist community.

The Czechoslovak delegation informed the delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union of the concrete measures carried out in Czechoslovakia to fulfill the indicated agreement, and also about its views on further work in this direction.

The Czechoslovak delegation stated that the Central Committee of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would take every measure to insure the fulfillment of the Moscow agreement.

They will step up efforts to raise the leading role of the Communist party, will intensify the struggle against the antisocialist forces, will take the necessary measures to place all the mass information media at the service of socialism, will reinforce the party and state organs with men firmly adhering to positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union confirmed its readiness to give the Czechoslovak comrades every assistance in the implementation of their plans directed at normalizing the situation in the country and in the party in the spirit of the agreement reached in Moscow.

The question of the presence of allied troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia was discussed in the course of the talks. The sides agreed that the Governments would consider and sign a treaty on the temporary stationing of allied troops in Czechoslovakia. In accordance with the documents of the August 23-26 talks in Moscow, the withdrawal of the other troops will be carried out by stages.

The delegations of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia discussed the tasks of strengthening the fraternal alliance and inviolable friendship between the peoples of the two countries, development between them of all-around fruitful cooperation in the economic,

*(Continued on page 245)*

## NATO Communiqué on Czechoslovakia

*On November 16, 1968, the Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a communiqué discussing the implications for NATO of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. Excerpts from the text of the communiqué follow:*

### [1]

The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial session in Brussels on 15 and 16 November. The meeting was attended by foreign, defense and finance ministers. The council had moved forward from mid-December its normal year-end meeting so that ministers might discuss at an earlier date the serious situation following the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia and the occupation of that country by forces of the Soviet Union and of four of its Warsaw Pact allies.

### [2]

Ministers reaffirmed the inviolability of the

principle, which has been invoked on numerous occasions by every country, including the U.S.S.R., that all nations are independent and that consequently any intervention by one state in the affairs of another is unlawful.

They noted that this principle has been deliberately violated by the Soviet leaders with the backing of four of their allies. World opinion has been profoundly shocked by this armed intervention carried out against the wishes of the Government and people of Czechoslovakia. All the members of the alliance have denounced this use of force which jeopardizes peace and international order and

strikes at the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Like all other peoples, the people of Czechoslovakia must be free to shape their future without outside interference. Agreements concluded under the pressure of occupying forces can provide no justification for challenging this basic concept.

### [3]

The contention of the Soviet leadership that there exists a right of intervention in the affairs of other states deemed to be within a so-called "socialist commonwealth" runs counter to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter, is dangerous to European security and has inevitably aroused grave anxieties. It gives rise to fear of a further use of force in other cases.

The use of force and the stationing in Czechoslovakia of Soviet forces not hitherto deployed there have aroused grave uncertainty and demand great vigilance on the part of the allies.

### [4]

(A) Applied to Germany, the policies which the U.S.S.R. derives from its doctrine of a so-called "socialist commonwealth" raise new obstacles to the rapprochement and ultimate unification of the two parts of Germany. Moreover, they would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the four-power agreements relating to Germany as a whole.

(B) In this situation, and bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the ministers reaffirm the determination of the alliance to persevere in its efforts to contribute to a peaceful solution of the German question based on the free decision of the German people and on the interests of European security.

Their governments do not recognize the "G.D.R." [(the) German Democratic Republic] and they reject all claims which would tend to perpetuate the division of Germany against the will of the German people.

(C) Referring to their communiqué issued in Reykjavik on 25 June, 1968, the ministers

confirm the support of their governments for the declared determination of the three powers to safeguard Berlin's security and to maintain freedom of access to the city.

They recall the declaration of the North Atlantic Council of Dec. 16, 1958, on Berlin and the responsibilities which each member state assumed with regard to the security and welfare of Berlin. They note with satisfaction the important measures taken by the Federal Republic of Germany in conformity with the status of Berlin for the purpose of maintaining the viability of the city.

They associate themselves with the position of the three powers as regards the legitimate concern of the federal government for the welfare and viability of Berlin and as regards the resulting ties which exist between the two on the basis of the arrangements in force.

(D) The ministers associate themselves with the call made upon the Soviet Union by the three powers to respect the quadripartite agreements concerning Berlin and the decisions taken pursuant to these agreements by the United States, France and the United Kingdom.

### [5]

The new uncertainties resulting from recent Soviet actions also extend to the Mediterranean basin. This situation requires that the allies continue by every available means their efforts to promote stability and a just and equitable peace, as well as mutual co-operation and understanding, in the area.

The expansion of Soviet activity in the Mediterranean, including the increased presence of Soviet naval units, requires vigilance to safeguard allied security.

### [6]

The members of the alliance urge the Soviet Union, in the interests of world peace, to refrain from using force and interfering in the affairs of other states.

Determined to safeguard the freedom and independence of their countries, they could not remain indifferent to any development which endangers their security.

Clearly any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences.

## [7]

So long as the Soviet leaders adhere to a policy of force, these new uncertainties will remain. The allies are convinced that their political solidarity remains indispensable to discourage aggression and other forms of oppression. Above all, they stand wholly determined to meet their common responsibilities and, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, to defend the members of the alliance against any armed attack.

## [8]

The allies participating in NATO's integrated defense program have, therefore, been obliged to reassess the state of their defenses. They consider that the situation arising from recent events calls for a collective response.

The quality, effectiveness and deployment of NATO's forces will be improved in terms of both manpower and equipment in order to provide a better capability for defense as far forward as possible. The quality of reserve forces will also be improved and their ability to mobilize rapidly will be increased.

Renewed attention will be directed to the provision of reinforcements for the flanks and the strengthening of local forces there.

The conventional capability of NATO's tactical air forces will be increased. Certain additional national units will be committed to the major NATO commanders. Specific measures have been approved within these categories of action for improving the conventional capability of NATO's forces.

The ministers agreed that the coordinated implementation of these measures and the provision of additional budgetary resources to the extent necessary to support them would form part of the NATO force plan for 1969 to be submitted in January, 1969.

They also acknowledged that the solidarity of the alliance can be strengthened by co-operation between members to alleviate burdens arising from balance of payments

deficits resulting specifically from military expenditures for the collective defense.

## [9]

A year ago, the ministers affirmed in the report on the future tasks of the alliance that, while maintaining adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter any aggressor, the alliance should work to promote a policy of détente.

The Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia has seriously set back hopes of settling the outstanding problems which still divide the European Continent and Germany and of establishing peace and security in Europe, and threatens certain of the results already achieved in the field of détente.

Indeed, in view of the action of the five members of the Warsaw Pact, the scope and level of allied contacts with them have had to be reduced.

## [10]

More specifically, prospects for mutual balanced force reductions have suffered a severe setback. Nevertheless, the allies in close consultation are continuing their studies and preparations for a time when the atmosphere for fruitful discussions is more favorable.

## [11]

In any event, consistent with Western values, the political goal remains that of secure, peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between East and West.

The allies are determined to pursue this goal, bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the alliance.

The search for peace requires progress, consistent with Western security, in the vital fields of disarmament and arms control and continuing efforts to resolve the fundamental issues which divide East and West.

## [12]

The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to stand as the indispensable guarantor of security and the essential foundation for the pursuit of European reconciliation.

*(Continued on page 245)*



## EAST EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

(Continued from page 205)

an inch even in such a relatively trivial matter as the problem of the Czechoslovak gold bullion seized by the Allies in 1945, valued at about \$20 million. This has been in United States custody ever since the end of World War II and the United States has consistently refused to return it to the Czechs.

Here again, the contrast with Poland is striking. In November, 1956, shortly after Wladyslaw Gomulka's return to power in Warsaw, the Eisenhower administration offered Poland substantial economic aid, although there was little concrete evidence that the country intended to follow the path of democratization. This aid continued for a number of years, despite growing signs that the "thaw" in Poland was rapidly turning back into frost. In the case of Czechoslovakia, it soon became clear that the country was firmly committed to a new liberal course. Thousands of Western journalists, scholars, students and ordinary tourists were able to see for themselves that Czechoslovakia was going through a period of peaceful revolution aimed at creating a new type of democratic socialism.

Despite all the evidence and despite all its previous solemn declarations stressing its continuing interest in the area, the United States did not move to help Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, in its determination not to antagonize the Soviet Union it did its best to remove any pretext for Soviet displeasure. Time and time again, administration officials, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, were carefully noncommittal when asked to comment on the Czechoslovak developments.<sup>10</sup> While their excuse was that any favorable comment might bring about Soviet wrath and

make the Czech position more difficult, there are grounds for suspecting that their real reason was the President's desire to stage another summit meeting with the Russians to end the war in Vietnam. It was feared that any expression of support for the Dubcek regime, however mild, might anger the Soviet leaders, thus making such a meeting impossible.

As it turned out, the President need not have worried. From a perspective of several months, it is safe to assume that the United States hands-off attitude made no difference insofar as the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was concerned. The Soviet leadership was much less (if at all) concerned with United States "bridge building" than with the effect of Czechoslovak democratization. While the United States lack of interest made no difference to the Russians, it left a bad impression in both West and East Europe. Many Europeans interpreted United States indifference at worst as a sign of United States-Soviet collusion to eliminate points of possible friction or, at best, as a tacit United States reaffirmation of the status quo in Europe dating back to the Yalta agreement.<sup>11</sup>

President Johnson's persistent attempts to meet with Premier Alexei Kosygin even *after* the invasion, coupled with the somewhat cynical remarks of Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy, strengthened the suspicion entertained by many Europeans that French President Charles de Gaulle was right to accuse the United States of trying to reach a *détente* with the Soviet Union at the expense of Europe. Subsequent attempts by the administration to warn the Russians not to invade Rumania and Yugoslavia, followed by somewhat cryptic statements by Secretary Rusk about extending the NATO umbrella to Yugoslavia, Austria and Rumania, did little to diminish the disappointment with, and lack of confidence in, United States policy.<sup>12</sup>

The story of United States policy in East Europe in recent years makes rather melancholy reading. The question that ought to be asked and answered concerns the future of United States policy in East Europe after the crisis in Czechoslovakia of 1968 and after the

<sup>10</sup> Cf. the Secretary's press conference of July 30, 1968. *Department of State Bulletin*, August 19, 1968.

<sup>11</sup> This was, at least, the unanimous opinion of people I met in Prague in December, 1968. For the official United States viewpoint, see Secretary Rusk's address "Some Myths and Misconceptions About U.S. Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* October 7, 1968.

<sup>12</sup> *The New York Times*, November 16, 1968.

change of administration in Washington. Lack of space prevents a full discussion of available alternatives, but some suggestions can be offered.

The new administration should face squarely the question as to whether United States engagement in East Europe is in our national interest. If the answer is "yes," then the administration should continue the policy of "bridge building." The temporary setback in Czechoslovakia should not deter President Richard Nixon from pursuing the policy of maintaining our presence in East Europe. A sincere effort should be made to explore other possible "bridges." Greater attention should be paid to individual countries, to achieve closer relations with those that obviously show interest in our initiative (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and possibly Hungary) while reducing our commitments to Poland, which shows little or no desire for improved relations with the United States.

The Nixon administration is in a good position to pursue these objectives. The resumption of the Paris peace talks means that the United States no longer needs to worry about maintaining Soviet goodwill and that it can shape its policy accordingly. The Republican administration cannot be blamed for the hands-off policy with regard to Czechoslovakia and thus is in a better position to convince West Europe as well as the various East European countries that the United States intends to continue its policy of "peaceful engagement." Finally, the change of administration in Washington provides a good opportunity to experiment with some fresh approaches to East Europe.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN TRANSITION

*(Continued from page 211)*

Soviet Union is perhaps nowhere as unpopular as in the Communist countries of East Europe. Only the Soviet Army can ensure the permanence of pro-Soviet allegiances of local Communist parties. The Soviet Union fears the Marxism of the reformers in East Europe. In Czechoslovakia, the quest for

internal reforms, for the autonomy to engage in socio-economic experimentation and innovation, for the authority to seek closer ties with West European countries will continue, irrespective of the leaders who eventually emerge from the current negotiations with the Soviet Union. Nationalist-minded Czech and Slovak elites will continue to resist the stifling embrace of the Russian bear; and any leadership seeking to entrench its power by means other than Soviet bayonets and secret police terror will have to give appropriate weight to nationalist aspirations.

An old Swahili proverb says that "When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers." In a world where the superpowers feel insecure, insist on exclusive spheres of influence, and accept no restraints upon their actions, it is the small nations who suffer first and most often. It may be fitting to recall the words of the son of the founder of Czechoslovakia, Jan Masaryk (who was murdered by the Soviet secret police in 1948): "In a world where there is no security for the small nations, there can be no security for the large nations."

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## YUGOSLAVIA: THE DIPLOMACY OF BALANCE

*(Continued from page 217)*

other seeming casualty of the Czechoslovakian episode. Questioned closely as to the status of the proposed Third Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, set for 1969, Tito admitted that planning was at a standstill, while Yugoslavia waited "until we see where the world is headed." What he did not mention was that both Egypt and India, Yugoslavia's partners in the Conference preplanning, had refused to condemn the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Still, he was sure that the conference would eventually be held, for the initiative in international affairs must not be allowed to rest solely with the great powers. Enlarging on this theme, he continued:

We have no reason to fear that we might be isolated, no matter on whose initiative. Yugoslavia has achieved status and prestige, and we shall

endeavor to act in the future in a way that will not diminish that prestige. We have taken the best path, of exploring together with others real possibilities for cooperation at the next Conference of Non-Aligned Nations. We are not going to get together to condemn anyone, but rather to say what we think the world should look like. . . .<sup>19</sup>

Tito's statement provides a fitting conclusion to this brief analysis of Yugoslavia's recent foreign policy experience, because it suggests both the ambitions and the limitations of Yugoslavia's role in international politics. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and its consequences constituted a serious setback to Yugoslavia's diplomacy of balance, reducing her influence within the Soviet bloc to the vanishing point, forcing her to suspend preparations for the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, and rendering her considerably more dependent upon the West than her leaders would have preferred.

The whole episode illustrates the vulnerability of the diplomacy of balance. But in the last analysis, the alternatives to this policy are far less attractive to Yugoslavia. Moreover, the setback was far from overwhelming. By the end of 1968, the Yugoslav leaders had begun to adjust to the new status quo and were well on the way to regaining the dynamic equilibrium that has characterized their nation's diplomacy and maintained its integrity since 1948.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

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## TWO GERMANIES: A NATION WITHOUT A STATE

*(Continued from page 229)*

on the relations of these components. Whether building bridges between East Berlin and Bonn will soften the rivalry of the larger blocs remains questionable. But the current bitterness that separates the Germanies with barbed wire and drawn bayonets presents no prospect other than a nuclear confrontation in which, as so many times in the past, Germans on both sides of the border will again be dying.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*(Continued from page 236)*

the massive American aid programs (dramatized by the Berlin airlift), and then the economic "miracle" that nourished democracy in the West. His detailed analysis of the Adenauer and Erhard years is superb, and he clarifies some difficult problems facing the Federal Republic today, above all the question of reunification, the resolution of which will be the major test of West Germany's apparent, Western-oriented, democratic stability. A generous helping of useful statistical tables and a set of unusual annotated illustration form an integral part of the well-written text.

George W. Baer  
University of California, Santa Cruz

MODERN ENGLAND: FROM THE 18TH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT. BY R. K. WEBB. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1968. xviii, 652 pages and index, \$12.50 hardcover, \$6.50 paperback.)

The nature of the modern world in a large measure has been determined by the activities of Englishmen: the early development of the still ongoing process of industrialization, the example of constitutional accommodation and relative social stability in the midst of rapid change, and the establishment of a vast empire that made the rest of the world conscious of Europe's accomplishments. Great Britain became the greatest nation in the world, but the days of that preeminence are now over and, no matter how grand their legacy, the English for the last fifty years have gradually divested themselves of the cost and demands of "greatness." To indicate the pace of change, the author poses the rhetorical question: If the United Nations were re-founded today, would Britain's right to a seat on the Security Council be as self-evident as it appeared in 1945?

In his well-written and useful book, Professor Webb presents a knowledgeable and accurate survey of the main events and fea-

tures of these last two remarkable centuries of English history. G.W.B.

**INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE 1945.** BY PETER CALVOCORESSI. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. 480 pages and index, \$7.50 hardcover, \$3.95 paperback.)

The scope of this work is world-wide. It is mainly, and reasonably, organized along geographic lines (e.g., Asia, Africa), and the broad implications of most contemporary events are related and are discussed in the various appropriate chapters.

The book is easy to read because much thought has been given to the writing. The author intends the book to stand on its own; there are no footnotes and no bibliography. Professor Calvocoressi is a competent and reliable guide to the international affairs of the past quarter-century. G.W.B.

## NATO COMMUNIQUE

*(Continued from page 241)*

By its constitution the alliance is of indefinite duration. Recent events have further demonstrated that its continued existence is more than ever necessary.

## SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

*(Continued from page 239)*

political, cultural and other spheres, and also strengthening of relations between towns and regions which maintain traditional friendly contacts.

The most important problems of insuring international peace and security were also discussed. The sides confirmed their determination to follow unswervingly the jointly drafted foreign political course in the interests of strengthening the socialist community and the successful struggle against the policy of imperialist powers.

In this the delegations view as their prime task the implementation of measures to create a reliable barrier in the way of the mounting

revanchist strivings of West German militaristic forces, the rendering of effective aid to the people of struggling Vietnam, the curbing of the imperialist aggression in the Middle East area.

The talks passed in a spirit of comradeship, businesslike cooperation and frankness.

## PRAVDA COMMUNIQUE

*(Continued from page 238)*

munity, would have come into conflict with its own vital interests and would have been detrimental to the other socialist states.

Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops would have been able to come up to the Soviet border, while the community of European socialist countries would have been split, in effect encroaches upon the vital interests of the peoples of these countries and conflicts, at the very root of it, with the right of these people to socialist self-determination.

Discharging their internationalist duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia and defending their own socialist gains, the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist states had to act decisively and they did act against the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia.

\* \* \*

The interests of the socialist community and of the whole revolutionary movement, the interests of socialism in Czechoslovakia demand complete exposure and political isolation of the reactionary forces in that country, consolidation of the working people and consistent implementation of the Moscow agreement between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders.

There is no doubt that the actions of the five allied socialist countries in Czechoslovakia directed to the defense of the vital interests of the socialist community, and the sovereignty of socialist Czechoslovakia first and foremost, will be increasingly supported by all those who have the interest of the present revolutionary movement, of peace and security of peoples, of democracy and socialism at heart.

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of February, 1969, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Alliance for Progress

Feb. 3—According to the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress, the growth rate of the Gross National Product for Alliance members was 5.5 per cent in 1968; in 1966 and 1967, the growth rate averaged 4.3 per cent of the G.N.P.

### Berlin Crisis

(See also *Germany, Democratic Republic of*)

Feb. 28—The U.S.S.R. and East Germany warn that they plan to apply selective restriction on traffic on the access routes between West Berlin and West Germany.

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

(See also *France*)

Feb. 24—French Foreign Minister Michel Debré tells ambassadors from Belgium, Italy, West Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands that the E.E.C. conflict over British membership does not lessen France's wish to continue to cooperate with her Common Market partners.

### French-Speaking Community

Feb. 23—*The New York Times* reports that at a meeting in Niamey, Niger, last week, representatives from French-speaking countries in Europe, North America, Asia and Africa agreed to set up an agency in Paris "to act as a clearing house for member countries in the fields of culture and technology" to facilitate cooperation and exchanges.

### International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

Feb. 20—The president of the U.S. American

Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, George Meany, declares that his organization is resigning from the I.C.F.T.U.; he charges that some members of the international organization are seeking "rapprochement" with Moscow, and that its finances have been mismanaged.

### Middle East Crisis

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Feb. 2—In Gaza, Israeli forces with nightsticks herd some 2,000 to 3,000 rioting Arab girls back into 3 girls' high schools. 90 of the girls are injured.

The U.S. magazine *Newsweek* publishes an exclusive interview with U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who declares that in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied during the June, 1967, 6-day war, the U.A.R. would offer a 5-point plan providing for: "a declaration of nonbelligerence; the recognition of the right of each country to live in peace; the territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East, including Israel, in recognized and secure borders; freedom of navigation on international waterways; a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem."

Feb. 4—Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban criticizes Nasser's proposals for a Middle East settlement as outlined in the *Newsweek* interview as "a plan for liquidating Israel in two stages."

It is reported that yesterday in Cairo an election was held for a new 11-man executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Yasir Arafat, head of the commando group Al Fatah, is elected chairman of the P.L.O. today.

Feb. 6—Israeli soldiers in Nablus on the Israeli-occupied West Bank fight with pro-Nasser demonstrators.



Feb. 13—The Jordanian representative to the U.N. asks U.N. Secretary General U Thant to urge Israel to rescind legislation under which all Jerusalem is to be united under Israeli rule. The implementation of the law, scheduled to take effect February 23, has been postponed by the Israeli government until May.

Feb. 18—During a stopover in Zurich, Switzerland, an Israeli El Al airliner is attacked by 4 Arab terrorists using a machinegun. An Israeli "security guard" aboard the plane shoots and kills one attacker.

U.N. Secretary General Thant deplores the Arab attack on the Israeli plane and expresses hope that Israel will refrain from retaliation.

Feb. 20—In a note to U Thant from Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Arab governments are charged with complicity in the terrorists attack on an Israeli plane at the Zurich airport. The note asks U Thant to elaborate on his plea for "constructive international action" to prevent the recurrence of such violence.

Feb. 21—In Jerusalem's largest supermarket, a bomb planted by terrorists explodes. Two young Israelis are killed; 9 are injured.

Feb. 24—Israeli planes attack 2 Arab commando bases 30 miles inside Syria which are reportedly bases for Al Fatah, the largest Arab commando organization.

## Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.)

Feb. 13—At a ministerial conference of the O.E.C.D., U.S. Under Secretary of State Elliot Lee Richardson assures the 22 member-nations that U.S. President Richard Nixon's administration plans to work for greater trade liberalization.

## United Nations

(See *Intl. Middle East Crisis*)

## War in Vietnam

Feb. 1—At the U.S. artillery base near Tay-ninh, 43 miles northwest of Saigon, U.S. troops fight 500 North Vietnamese for 5 hours.

Feb. 3—In Paris for the peace talks, South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky declares that his government is ready to "hold private talks now" with North Vietnamese representatives. He also asserts that he is "ready to make more concessions, in any field, if we are sure to reach some result."

Feb. 4—The U.S. Air Force reveals that it will give South Vietnam's Air Force 60 jet fighter-bombers.

Allied officials disclose that Vietcong terrorist activities increased by almost 30 per cent in January, 1969, over December, 1968.

Feb. 6—South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu declares that his country will not abandon the Paris peace talks until a settlement is reached.

At the third plenary meeting of the broadened Paris peace talks, the appeal of the U.S. and South Vietnam for reconsideration of Allied proposals to deescalate the war in Vietnam is rejected by North Vietnam and the Vietcong.

Feb. 8—Vice President Ky leaves Paris for Saigon.

Feb. 10—Le Duc Tho, political leader of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris, leaves for consultations in Hanoi with planned stopovers in Moscow and Peking.

Feb. 13—The fourth plenary session of the Paris peace talks is held.

Feb. 15—The South Vietnamese government announces a 24-hour truce for Allied troops and its own forces beginning at midnight, because of the Lunar New Year, or Tet. The Vietcong holiday truce begins early today, and is scheduled to last 7 days.

Feb. 23—Saigon and about 30 other South Vietnamese towns, cities and bases are shelled by enemy forces. This is the first rocket attack on Saigon since the U.S. stopped the bombing of North Vietnam November 1, 1968.

Feb. 24—Enemy forces strike simultaneously against Saigon and 115 other towns and military posts in South Vietnam.

Feb. 25—Enemy forces attack 60 towns and military posts in South Vietnam.

North Vietnamese troops stage 2 attacks on U.S. Marines in an area south of the demilitarized zone. Enemy suicide troops with explosives strapped on their backs blow holes in the barbed wire surrounding the edge of a Marine camp.

Ky returns to Paris from South Vietnam.

The Hanoi radio broadcasts a statement by the North Vietnam Foreign Affairs Ministry asserting that the U.S. halt in the bombing of North Vietnam was unconditional. The Foreign Affairs Ministry denies U.S. allegations that North Vietnam had agreed not to shell civilian centers in South Vietnam or to violate the demilitarized zone.

Feb. 27—Vietcong and North Vietnamese attacks on towns and bases in South Vietnam continue for the 4th consecutive day.

### **Western European Union**

Feb. 26—The Council of the Western European Union meets in London; France is boycotting the session. (See also *France*.)

### **ARGENTINA**

Feb. 7—Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Méndez tells reporters that the Latin American countries are exchanging views on their position toward the Nixon administration, but denies that they are trying to form a common front to meet the new administration.

### **AUSTRALIA**

Feb. 10—Prime Minister John Gorton announces the appointment of Paul Hasluck, former Minister for External Affairs, as the new Governor General. In this position, Hasluck will be the head of state and representative of Queen Elizabeth II.

### **BOLIVIA**

Feb. 1—President René Barrientos Ortuño accuses Cuba of preparing a “new adventure” against Bolivia to “revenge” the collapse of the rebellion led by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, the late aide to Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Feb. 2—It is reported from La Paz that an

“additionality clause,” which was added to U.S. foreign aid loans last year in an effort to ease U.S. balance of payments problems, has brought American assistance to Bolivia to a standstill.

### **BRAZIL**

Feb. 8—The Brazilian government announces the indefinite suspension of 5 state legislative assemblies and the dismissal of 33 more federal lawmakers. The assemblies of Guanabara, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco and Sergipe states are suspended on charges of corruption.

Feb. 26—Civilian legislators are brought under additional controls by the regime of President Artur da Costa e Silva. Salaries and bonuses for “special sessions” are limited and interim elections are forbidden.

Feb. 27—New government decrees provide for rapid expropriation of large estates in an effort to speed agrarian reform.

### **CANADA**

Feb. 4—Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp indicates that Canada may be willing to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan in preparation for the resumption of ties with the People's Republic of China.

### **CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)**

Feb. 3—Reports from Hong Kong describe large-scale troop movements, which are apparently being ordered in an effort to remove the troops from areas where they have become too involved with local factions.

Feb. 8—Visitors to Peking report that new organizations of Red Guards are being formed among children in the 3½-to 6-year-old age groups.

Feb. 19—The official Chinese newspaper *Jenmin Jih Pao* attacks President Richard Nixon and U.S. “monopoly-capitalism” and declares that proposed talks between U.S. and Chinese representatives in Warsaw have been cancelled.

## COLOMBIA

Feb. 6—Governor Mejia Duque of Risaralda Province asks the “immediate retirement” of 10 to 18 U.S. Peace Corps workers in the city of Pereira. A government spokesman says the Governor acted on the request of the Mayor of Pereira, who has accused the Peace Corps workers of seeking to turn the citizenry against President Carlos Lleras Restrepo.

## CUBA

Feb. 11—It is reported that yesterday the Havana Radio announced a Cuban-Soviet trade agreement which provides for a large Soviet credit to cover Cuban deficits in exports in 1969 in trade with the Soviet Union.

The U.S. State Department announces that Cuba has agreed to a U.S. proposal for facilitating the return of passengers aboard airplanes hijacked to Havana. It is agreed that passengers will be allowed to return on the hijacked planes if the airline accepts full responsibility for the safety of the aircraft.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Feb. 2—The chairman of Czechoslovakia’s National Front, Evzen Erban, heads a delegation to Moscow to “normalize” relations with the Warsaw Pact countries which invaded Czechoslovakia in August, 1968.

Feb. 5—Party leader Alexander Dubcek says he will take “resolute steps” against neo-stalinist extremists and against those who insist on pressing reforms. He urges party unity in the country’s “serious crisis.”

It is reported that Czechoslovak courts are continuing to “rehabilitate” citizens imprisoned during the Stalinist regime. Compensation for lost wages and property is being paid to the victims.

Feb. 7—Pledges of commercial credits amounting to \$200 million to \$300 million are announced by Premier Oldrich Cernik. The credits, reportedly from Western commercial banks, will be used to help modernize Czechoslovak industries.

Feb. 28—*Rude Pravo*, the Communist party

newspaper, rejects any “return to outdated centralist forms” of world communism.

## EIRE

Feb. 1—Teachers in the nation’s high schools strike for higher wages.

Feb. 6—Bakery workers join in a general strike of maintenance workers begun yesterday. Fifteen major unions agree to meet with employers to begin wage negotiations.

Feb. 12—Some 50,000 workers are made idle by a general strike. The government estimates export losses at \$2.4 million a day.

## FRANCE

Feb. 2—President Charles de Gaulle proposes extensive constitutional reforms to give more autonomy to the provinces.

Feb. 17—The government announces it will end all participation in the Western European Union, the group composed of Britain and the 6 members of the Common Market. The government charges that Britain is trying to use the union as a “back door” to force entry into the Common Market, from which she has been barred by French veto.

Feb. 21—According to British government sources, President de Gaulle has suggested replacing the European Common Market with a new trading group that would include Great Britain, with an inner directorate of France, Britain, West Germany and Italy.

## GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

(See also *Germany, Federal Republic of; U.S.S.R.; Intl, Berlin Crisis*)

Feb. 6—The East German government warns West Germany against announced plans to have the West German Federal Assembly meet in West Berlin to elect a new West German President.

Feb. 12—The East German government sends strong protest notes to the United States, Britain and France declaring that the West German government has no right to hold elections in West Berlin.

Feb. 14—It is disclosed by West German government sources that East Germany is practicing jamming radio and radar equipment on West European planes that are using the air corridors to West Berlin.

Feb. 15—Restrictions are increased on overland travel from West Germany to West Berlin. In an attempt to force cancellation of the presidential election scheduled for March 5, 1969, by West Germany in West Berlin, East Germany has instituted frequent inspections and delays at checkpoints along the highways leading to Berlin.

### **GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)**

(See also *Germany, Democratic Republic of; U.S.S.R.*)

Feb. 25—In an address to the Cabinet, Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger urges the Soviets to "give some sign that through a practical solution a service to the cause of peace can be performed." He is hopeful that an easing of tensions might result from an agreement to permit freer travel between East and West Berlin in exchange for the transfer of the West German presidential elections away from West Berlin.

### **GUATEMALA**

Feb. 3—Guatemala's Christian Democratic party nominates Jorge Lucas Caballeros, former Minister of the Interior, as its candidate in the presidential election scheduled for 1970.

Feb. 20—Brigadier General Rolando Chinchilla Aguilar is replaced as Defense Minister by Brigadier General Doroteo Reyes Santacruz. Chinchilla has been widely mentioned as a possible presidential candidate of the government's Revolutionary party.

### **INDIA**

Feb. 5—Balloting begins in state elections for seats in the State Assembly in New Delhi.

Feb. 11—The ruling Congress party wins the majority of seats in Uttar Pradesh province.

Feb. 12—A coalition of parties led by the Left Communists defeats the Congress party in West Bengal.

Feb. 25—Most Cabinet posts in West Bengal go to Left Communists in the new United Front government installed today.

### **ISRAEL**

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Feb. 26—Premier Levi Eshkol dies following a heart attack. Deputy Premier Yigal Allon will head a caretaker government.

### **ITALY**

Feb. 5—A one-day general strike shuts down industries and ports throughout Italy as union members strike for better pensions. This is the third national work stoppage in 3 months.

Feb. 8—Speaking at the 12th congress of the Italian Communist party, leader Luigi Longo assails the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. Nonetheless, he withdraws objections to a Soviet plan for a summit meeting of all Communist parties later in 1969.

Feb. 11—The Communist party congress cheers the name of Czechoslovak Communist leader Alexander Dubcek. The Soviet representative, Boris Ponomarev, receives only polite applause.

Feb. 13—Italian labor unions and the government have reached agreement on increased pensions, according to an announcement from Rome.

### **MOZAMBIQUE**

Feb. 3—The leader of the anti-Portuguese liberation front, Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, is assassinated in Tanzania. Mondlane united several nationalist groups opposed to continued Portuguese rule, and led their struggle for independence.

### **NEW ZEALAND**

Feb. 25—Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake says that Australia and New Zealand will maintain military forces in Malaysia and Singapore after the British withdraw their defense forces from the area in 1971.

### **NICARAGUA**

Feb. 6—It is disclosed that Nicaragua has

carried out her first commercial transaction with a Communist country since 1945. The Managua Cotton Cooperative says it has sold 25,000 bales of cotton to Czechoslovakia at \$24.50 a bale.

## **NIGERIA**

Feb. 17—A proposal by former Nigerian President Nnamdi Azikiwe for ending the war with secessionist Biafra is rejected by the Nigerian federal government.

## **PAKISTAN**

Feb. 1—President Mohammed Ayub Khan announces that he will discuss constitutional changes with the responsible leaders of opposition parties.

Feb. 6—A formal invitation to confer on political problems is extended by Ayub Khan to a Central Democratic Action Committee.

Feb. 14—Ayub Khan grants 2 of the 3 demands made by political opponents. He releases a number of political detainees and lifts a "state of emergency" imposed in 1965.

Feb. 19—Violence continues as opposition leaders cancel plans for talks with Ayub Khan.

Feb. 21—Ayub Khan announces he will not run for the presidency next year in view of the unrest in the country.

Feb. 23—Zulikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the opposition, announces he will not run for the presidency if the opposition parties can agree on a candidate from East Pakistan. Ali Bhutto is a West Pakistani. The East Pakistanis have been protesting their "under-representation" in government.

## **PANAMA**

Feb. 7—Guerrillas appear to have opened a new front in the mountains of central Panama, 125 miles west of the capital. Colonel Boris Martínez, Chief of Staff of the National Guard, confirms the death of 2 members of the Guard in a clash with guerrillas in the area on February 2. Previous guerrilla activity has been confined to the western province of Chiriqui, in the area bordering Costa Rica.

Feb. 23—The government announces the abolition of a dozen or more political parties.

## **PERU**

Feb. 1—Peru and the Soviet Union agree to establish diplomatic relations. The revolutionary military government of Peru earlier established diplomatic relations with 3 other Communist countries: Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

Feb. 5—The deadline for the payment of a \$14.4 million bill charged by the government against the International Petroleum Company passes. With the passing of the deadline, the Peruvian military regime claims the right to auction off all the company's holdings.

Feb. 6—President Juan Velasco Alvarado, in a speech to the nation, announces that his regime has begun steps to collect \$690,524,283 which he describes as a debt the International Petroleum Company owes to the people of Peru for its activities in the nation since 1924.

Feb. 12—A Peruvian Navy gunboat fires on U.S. tuna boats fishing off the Peruvian coast. One boat is damaged, captured and later freed at the northern port of Talara after the captain pays a fine. Peru claims jurisdiction of waters 200 miles offshore. The U.S. recognizes a 3-mile limit plus an additional 9-mile fishing zone.

Feb. 13—The government says it reserves the right to take whatever measures it deems necessary to protect Peru's economy if the U.S. retaliates for the seizure of the International Petroleum Company properties in Peru without compensation. U.S. law requires the cessation of economic aid to any country expropriating U.S. property if compensation is not paid within 6 months of the seizure date.

Feb. 15—In the second successive night of anti-U.S. bombing, 2 bombs explode outside the General Motors plant and 1 explodes in the garden of the U.S. cultural institute in Lima.

Feb. 16—Peru recalls to Lima for consultation her ambassadors to Washington and



to the Organization of American States.  
Feb. 17—Peru signs her first trade accord with the Soviet Union.

Feb. 22—It is reported that the military regime has permitted political leader Victor Raul Haya de la Torre to return to the country after an 11-month absence.

### RUMANIA

Feb. 8—The new Soviet doctrine of the "limited sovereignty" of Communist countries is denounced by President Nicolae Ceausescu. Ceausescu emphasizes Rumania's belief in the independence and sovereignty of Communist countries and urges "noninterference in internal affairs."

### SOUTHERN YEMEN

Feb. 12—President Qahtan al-Shaabi tells a Yemeni crowd that during his recent visit to the U.S.S.R., Southern Yemen was given generous Soviet aid.

### SPAIN

Feb. 3—The government closes a large steel mill after a 3-day strike protesting the government's imposition of a "state of emergency" last month.

Feb. 12—Fines and prison terms are levied against 16 union members and 5 Basque nationalists accused of attending illegal meetings and distributing leaflets.

### THAILAND

Feb. 10—The first general election in 11 years is held in Thailand. The country has been ruled by a military government since 1958. A new constitution promulgated in June, 1968, provides for popular elections to a House of Representatives.

Feb. 12—The United Thai People's party, headed by Premier Thanom Kittikachorn, wins a commanding lead in the general elections.

### TURKEY

Feb. 8—Foreign Ministry spokesmen deny that Soviet submarines are being permitted to pass through the Bosphorus to the Mediterranean Sea from the Black Sea. Zeki Kuneralp, general secretary for the minis-

try, says that such passage would violate the Montreux Convention and that Turkey would not permit it.

### U.S.S.R.

(See also *Germany, Democratic Republic of; Germany, Federal Republic of*)

Feb. 7—Reports from West German government sources indicate that the Soviets have offered West Germany "generous consideration" if they will sign the international treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Feb. 10—The commander of the Warsaw Pact military forces, Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, flies to East Germany to discuss growing East-West conflict over access to West Berlin.

Feb. 21—It is announced in Moscow that Soviet and East German troops will hold exercises in East Germany during the election of West Germany's President in West Berlin.

Feb. 23—The Soviet government offers to ask for a concession from East Germany if the West Germans will shift their presidential election from West Berlin. The concession would include permission for West Germans to visit relatives in East Germany during the Easter holidays—the first passes offered in 3 years.

### UNITED KINGDOM, THE

(See also *France*)

Feb. 1—The government announces that strikes during 1968 cost British industry 4.7 million man-days.

Feb. 4—London dockworkers call a wildcat strike for higher pay.

Feb. 13—January, 1969, figures released by the Board of Trade show that the trade gap has been reduced to a 6-month low.

Feb. 25—It is reported that yesterday's general election in Northern Ireland failed to give a majority to Prime Minister Terence O'Neill. O'Neill had called for a moderate reform to give greater civil rights to the Catholic minority.

Feb. 27—British banks raise their rate from 7 per cent to 8 per cent in a move to reduce

imports and strengthen the balance of payments.

## British Territories

### Anguilla

Feb. 7—By a vote of 1,739 to 4, the citizens of the island of Anguilla in the Caribbean vote to cut their ties with Britain and become the Western Hemisphere's smallest republic. Anguilla, linked to Britain since 1650, has been part of a 3-island federation with St. Kitts and Nevis. Anguillans claim they have been neglected by the larger islands.

Feb. 18—The temporary ruling council of Anguilla sets elections for March 11 and March 25 for the 11-member legislature, and April 3 for the election of a President and Vice President.

## UNITED STATES

### Civil Rights

(See also *Govt.*, Feb. 13)

Feb. 10—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert H. Finch declares that the administration plans to enforce school desegregation in the North and in the South.

In Chicago, a federal judge rules that the Chicago Housing Authority has unconstitutionally practiced racial discrimination in selecting sites for public housing and in methods of assigning tenants. Fewer Negroes are assigned to projects in predominantly white areas; fewer public housing sites are rejected in Negro areas than in white areas.

Feb. 11—The Justice Department charges that the Houston, Texas, Independent School District is illegally maintaining a dual school system for most white and black students. The department asks a federal district court to void the district's freedom-of-choice desegregation plan. The district is the largest in the South and the sixth largest in the country.

In Richmond, Virginia, a 3-judge federal court says the state's program of tuition grants for children attending private schools is unconstitutional.

In Montgomery, Alabama, a 3-judge federal court orders the state of Alabama to integrate the staff and the patients in its 3 mental hospitals within 1 year.

## Economy

Feb. 26—Some 4.9 million cars and trucks are recalled for repair of possible safety defects by the General Motors Corporation; this is the largest recall in the history of the automobile industry.

## Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl.*, War in Vietnam)

Feb. 5—The U.S. suggests to the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and France that preliminary conferences should be held at the U.N. to explore the possibility of a Middle East settlement.

President Richard Nixon asks the Senate to ratify the treaty to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Feb. 6—The President announces at his news conference that he plans to tour West Europe for 9 days, starting February 23, in a move aimed at "strengthening and revitalizing" the North Atlantic community.

Feb. 17—The President announces that New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller (R.) has agreed to undertake a series of visits to Latin American countries to consult with political leaders there "concerning the development of common goals and joint programs of action which will strengthen Western Hemisphere unity and accelerate the pace of economic development."

President Nixon confers with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., for an hour.

Feb. 19—According to *The New York Times*, Communist sources have revealed that Dobrynin issued a general invitation to the President to visit Moscow; the substance of the President's meeting with the Soviet Ambassador on February 17 is not disclosed.

Feb. 23—President Nixon arrives in Belgium at the beginning of an 8-day working visit to West Europe.

Feb. 24—The President confers with British

Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London.  
Feb. 28—President Nixon arrives in France after conferences in Rome.

## Government

Feb. 3—President Nixon names New York State Education Commissioner James E. Allen as United States Commissioner of Education; Allen will also assume the duties of the Assistant Secretary for Education in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Feb. 5—The President announces that all postmaster and rural letter carrier appointments are to be removed from the political patronage system.

The House Rules Committee votes 12 to 3 to refuse to clear for floor action a resolution vetoing the scheduled pay raises for members of Congress, Cabinet officers and federal judges. The raises will be effective February 15 under a 1967 law that provides that the President's proposals for such raises are effective in 30 days unless the proposals are vetoed by the House or Senate. The Senate refused to veto the raises yesterday, voting 47 to 34.

Feb. 6—President Nixon announces that John A. Hannah, president of Michigan State University, is to head the Agency for International Development, succeeding William S. Gaud.

Feb. 7—For the second time in a week, Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel orders oil companies to stop drilling the offshore oil wells in the Santa Barbara (California) Channel. The drilling has caused an oil slick on a 200-square-mile area of the Pacific Ocean off California's coast.

The President names California State Assemblyman John G. Veneman, Jr., as Under Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

Feb. 8—The leaking oil well off the California coast is sealed; it produced an oil slick on 800 square miles of ocean, including nearly 30 miles of coastline.

Feb. 9—More oil leaks into the Santa Barbara Channel; a spokesman for the Union Oil Company says the oil is not a new leak

but is "bleeding off from the oil-bearing sands on the ocean floor."

Feb. 12—President Nixon names James Farmer, former national director of CORE (the Congress of Racial Equality) as Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for Administration. Farmer is the first nationally known Negro to accept a post in the Nixon administration.

Feb. 13—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert Finch announces that effective March 16 the department will cut off federal funds for 3 Southern school districts that have refused to comply with federal orders for satisfactory desegregation.

Feb. 14—Senators and Representatives receive a pay raise; their salaries increase from \$30,000 to \$42,500 annually.

Feb. 15—To give his new staff time to study the measures, Secretary of Labor George P. Shultz postpones for 90 days implementation of a list of new industrial health and safety standards signed by his predecessor, W. Willard Wirtz. Shultz' action, which postpones the institution of mine safety reforms, is criticized by those who are urging stricter mine safety measures.

Feb. 16—It is reported that the Nixon administration plans to replace Director of the Bureau of Mines John F. O'Leary with H. Beecher Charnbury, Pennsylvania's Secretary of Mines and Mineral Industries. O'Leary is a strong advocate of stricter regulation of health and safety regulations for the nation's mines.

Feb. 17—Hickel declares that the oil companies involved are responsible for controlling and removing oil slicks and other pollution in the wake of offshore drilling operations; no proof that the company is at fault is required. If the company fails to act, the federal government is to remove the pollution and charge the cost to the company involved.

Feb. 18—A \$100,000 cut made by the Senate Rules Committee in the budget of the Senate Committee investigating hunger and malnutrition in the U.S. is rejected by voice vote in the Senate. Shortly before the vote, South Carolina Senator Ernest

Hollings (D.) tells the committee that there is widespread hunger among his constituents and that he bears a share of the responsibility for not acknowledging it sooner.

The House of Representatives votes to change the name of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (H.U.A.C.) to the House Internal Security Committee.

Feb. 19—President Nixon tells Congress that he will retain the Office of Economic Opportunity but will move the Head Start program to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Job Corps to the Department of Labor.

Feb. 20—President Nixon assumes "full responsibility for oil import policies."

The President asks Congress to pass a constitutional amendment providing that a candidate could become President of the United States with 40 per cent of the Electoral College vote; at present, a candidate must win a majority of the electoral vote. He also suggests that the electoral votes of each state should be divided "in a manner that may more closely approximate the popular vote than does the present system."

Feb. 22—H. Beecher Charnbury says he will remain as Pennsylvania's Secretary of Mines and Mineral Industries, refusing Hickel's invitation to replace John O'Leary as director of the Bureau of Mines.

The White House reveals that Securities and Exchange Commission member Hamer H. Budge has been appointed as chairman of the commission, succeeding Manuel F. Cohen, a Democrat, who has resigned.

Feb. 24—President Nixon asks Congress to pass new legislation changing the form of the ceiling on the national debt: he suggests that the ceiling should apply only to that part of the debt held by the general public, and that it not be applicable to investments of the Government's "trust funds" in Government bonds. If the change were made, the President suggests, the ceiling could be lowered from \$365 billion to \$300 billion, and if the budget were balanced, the debt ceiling would not continue to rise.

Feb. 26—The Coast Guard reports that a new leak is gushing oil into the Pacific Ocean; the slick is reported to be 6 miles long and 150 yards wide. The leak comes from the same platform as the leak that caused the temporary federal ban on drilling in California's Santa Barbara Channel.

Governors meeting at the National Governors Conference endorse President Nixon's statement of February 24 taking a stern stand against university campus disruption.

## Labor

(See also *Intl. I.C.F.T.U.*)

Feb. 4—President of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. George Meany reveals that the A.F.L.-C.I.O. will raise \$220,000 to pay the fine levied against the United Federation of Teachers for conducting a strike against New York City's public schools in 1968.

Feb. 10—The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union reveals that it has reached an agreement with the Shell Oil Company and the Continental Oil Company, covering some 1,745 workers; the agreement must be ratified by the workers. In the event of ratification, some 16,000 oil workers will still be on strike. The strike began January 4, and originally involved 60,000 workers. (See also *Current History*, March, 1969, U.S., Labor, p. 190.)

Feb. 14—In the Port of New York, members of the International Longshoremen's Association vote nearly 3 to 1 to ratify a new contract, ending a 56-day strike. All ports from Maine to Texas have been closed. The new contract includes total money improvements of \$1.60 an hour over 3 years, a guarantee of 2,080 hours of employment annually and a make-work clause allowing men to unpack and reload certain container cargoes.

Feb. 22—The A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s executive council says that at its worst the concept of "black capitalism" is a "dangerous divisive delusion" and urges instead a national commitment to full employment.

Feb. 23—The dock strike enters its 65th day

in Boston and in Mobile, Alabama; some 85 per cent of the dock workers have returned to work.

## Military

Feb. 4—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announces that his department will urge major revisions in the pay structure of the military establishment as a first step toward lessening dependence on the draft.

Feb. 6—The Department of Defense announces that Laird has temporarily halted deployment of the Sentinel antimissile system around the U.S., pending a review.

Feb. 11—A spokesman for the Defense Department, in congressional testimony made public today, says that the estimated \$5.5 billion cost of the Sentinel antimissile system is only the first installment of an effective defense against a possible missile threat from China.

Feb. 20—Laird declares that because of "very rapid" Soviet strides in the arms race, the U.S. must deploy a missile defense system; he suggests that the Sentinel antiballistic missile system may need revision to give it some capability against a Soviet as well as a Chinese threat.

## Politics

Feb. 8—The Democratic National Chairman, Oklahoma Senator Fred R. Harris, names 2 special commissions to look into the possibility of reforming the party's delegate selection process to make the process more democratic before the 1972 election. Minimal representation on the commissions is given to old-line party machine leaders.

Feb. 18—The White House reveals that Ray C. Bliss has resigned as chairman of the Republican National Committee.

Feb. 26—The White House announces that Representative Rogers C. B. Morton (Maryland) will replace Ray C. Bliss as Republican National Chairman.

## Science and Space

Feb. 24—An Atlas-Centaur rocket launches Mariner 6, an unmanned spacecraft, on a journey to Mars; the launching signals the

beginning of a 5-year program to study the possibility of life on Mars.

## Supreme Court

Feb. 24—The Supreme Court rules 7 to 2 that officials of public schools may not prevent students from expressing political opinions during schools hours if such expressions are not disruptive; school officials in Des Moines, Iowa, are held to have violated the First Amendment rights of 3 children when they suspended them for wearing black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam.

## VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

## VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

Feb. 1—President Nguyen Van Thieu personally accepts a pledge of loyalty to South Vietnam by the Montagnards, or mountain tribesmen, who have been struggling for autonomy.

## YUGOSLAVIA

Feb. 1—President Tito confers with Rumanian President Nicolae Ceausescu in a Rumanian city 60 miles northeast of the Yugoslav border.

Feb. 10—It is reported that Yugoslavia and West Germany have just signed an agreement providing for economic, industrial and technical cooperation.

Feb. 11—The Federal Assembly unanimously approves a national defense law establishing territorial defense units that will assist the regular army in the event of an invasion or military conflict. The law will become final 8 days after it is published in the official *Gazette*.

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